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INTRODUCTION

While direct broadcasting satellites (DBS) always have been
scientifically complex devices,1 the issues arising from communications satellites make them legally complicated devices as well. In
the United States the DBS technology is on the verge of full commercial exploitation, and the giants in the communications industry already have staked their claims to this potential technological
gold mine.2 In the international arena, DBS is the subject of a bit1.

Direct broadcasting satellites are highpower, geostationary satellites that take audio

and video signals from ground or other supersurface transmitters and retransmit them in
the form of radio communication for direct reception by dish-shaped antennae. See generally Kluger, A TV Dish in Every Yard, ScL DIG., Mar. 1982, at 76-77 (describing status and

future outlook for satellite-to-dish signals).
2. The Federal Communications Commission already has accepted eight applications
to provide DBS services to consumers. The FCC has accepted applications from CBS, Inc.;
Direct Broadcasting Satellite Corp. (DBSC); Graphic Scanning Corp. (Graphic); RCA American Communications, Inc. (RCA); United States Satellite Broadcasting Company, Inc.
(USSB); Video Satellite Systems, Inc. (Videosat); Western Union Telegraph Company
(Western Union); and Satellite Television Corporation (STC). In re Application of Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 92 F.C.C.2d 64 (1982).
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ter international debate in the United Nations. Thus far, the
United States position supporting free enterprise and free expression for DBS is proving to be the minority view.'
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates
the United States DBS industry and has developed new regulations for evaluating proposed services and assigning broadcasting
frequencies.4 The Commission's approach is consistent with the
United States' international policy favoring the free flow of information and with domestic policy favoring reduced regulation of
broadcasting. 5 The rapid technological development of DBS in the
United States, and the FCC's nurturing of that development, is intensifying the international debate in which a majority of the
world's nations has expressed the fear that uncensored broadcasting would contaminate the various nations' cultures.' The FCC's
action in tentatively assigning frequencies in advance of the International Telecommunications Union's (ITU's) allocation of frequencies to the United States has exacerbated the fears and further intensified the debate.
This Article examines the legal and technological development
3. A recent United Nations General Assembly vote on the United States "free speech"
position went 108 to 13 against the United States. Pace, TV Curb Is Backed By U.N. Assembly, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1982, at A6, col. 1. Most developed nations joined the United
States to make up the thirteen in minority. See id.
4. See infra part II, section B, subsection 2.
5.

UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS POLICY

generally HOUSE

(1980). See

COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW: FORGING

A NEW FRAMEWORK, H.R. REP. No. 1535, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-23 (1980) (discussing

problems, means of resolution, and recommendations concerning international information
systems). The continuing debate over the first amendment's scope and application illustrates the cherished position the amendment holds in American society and law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (indicating that a "more
exacting judicial scrutiny" of legislation that restrains the dissemination of information is
appropriate); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 93-98

(1948) ("Public" speech should be immune to governmental interference while government
may regulate "private" speech to some extent.). The amendment's philosophical basis, however, is unquestioned. See J.S. MILL, ON LmERTY (1859) (in society's search for truth, even
false opinion has value in open debate). The difficulty in deriving a cohesive approach toward the first amendment's application in particular circumstances triggers much of the
debate. For example, the "clear and present danger" test attempts to delineate permissible
governmental regulation of speech content by emphasizing that an imminent, temporal
threat of action must exist. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The "twotiered" approach categorizes certain types of speech, also based on content, as either less
protected or unprotected. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). When
the government seeks to regulate the exercise of free speech through time, place, and manner restrictions that are content-neutral, a "balancing approach" focuses upon the competing interests. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
6. See infra part III.
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of DBS in both the domestic and international fora. Part II examines the development of DBS and information policy concerning
DBS in the United States. The Article then in part III discusses
the international positions of the developed nations, the developing countries, and the Soviet bloc on the DBS issues and reveals
the results thus far in the policy debate among these nations and
the United States. Part IV concludes the Article with a brief outline of the possibilities for international cooperation to solve the
DBS controversy.
II.

THE UNITED STATES POSITION: REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY
AND CONTENT

A.

The Constitution

1. The First Amendment
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."'7 Consequently, American courts are particularly sensitive to any hint of governmental
censorship or prior restraint;8 however, the courts recognize that
some restraints on expression are necessary to the public interest
and thus permissible to a limited extent. For example, the government may restrict the public use of "fighting words" because society has a compelling interest in preserving public order and
preventing violence.' Similarly, the government may restrict a
speaker's access to public places-such as libraries, schools, and
jail grounds-if the restriction is nondiscriminatory and is reasonable because of the nature of the place and the normal activities
occurring there.10 Although the courts favor an open and unre7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (Prior restraint of news reporting is constitutionally impermissible.). Some types of speech, however, do not receive full first amendment protection. See Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech given first amendment protection to extent it provides information of public interest); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)
(first amendment never has protected false information).
9. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
10. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding an antinoise ordinance near a school although it limited freedom of speech exercised in that location). It is
crucial, however, that an alternative speech outlet be available. Id.; Schad v. Mt. Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981); cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (city
may place zoning restrictions on location of adult theaters).
If the area is a traditional "public forum" such as a street or a park, then the government may restrict access as long as the restriction is independent of the content of the
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strained marketplace of ideas, the government has a compelling interest in protecting the privacy of a potential audience and the
sensitivities of the unwilling listener.1 1 At times, when speech intrudes into the home and a "captive audience" cannot avoid exposure, the government may have limited authority to restrict intrusion. 12 Offensiveness or indecency, as distinguished from obscenity,

has raised particular problems.1 " Visual display in public of a single four-letter expletive expressing a political opinion cannot be
prohibited on the basis of offensiveness.1 4 The offended persons
present can avert their eyes. 5 The government, however, may restrict offensive or indecent speech to protect the privacy of the

home or to protect a "captive audience" that cannot avoid
exposure."
Other types of speech that the first amendment specifically affects include defamation1 7 and commercial advertising.1 8 The despeech. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (struck
down ordinance barring door-to-door and on-street solicitations of contributions by charitable organizations that did not use at least 75% of their receipts for "charitable purposes");
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (upholding individual's right to impart peacefully views to others on public street); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating
city bans against distribution of leaflets). Commentators have interpreted Schneider as
guaranteeing a right of access to public streets for the promulgation of views and opinions.
See, e.g., Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1,
16-29.
No right of guaranteed access to private property exists. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976) (no first amendment right to enter shopping center to advertise labor
dispute).
11. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
12. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (right of individual "to be let alone" sufficient for law enabling person to refuse certain types of mail);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (government may prohibit sound trucks on public
streets emitting "loud and raucous" noises in order to protect homes or businesses when
other outlets for speech are available).
13. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance of
this distinction in the broadcasting context.
14. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
15. Id. at 21. Accord Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (striking down state ordinance making use of "opprobrious words or abusive language" a breach of the peace).
16. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975) (striking down municipal ordinance restricting drive-in movie theaters with screens visible from public streets
from showing films containing nudity).
17. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (limiting public official's
ability to recover damages in libel action relating to his official conduct); see also Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (applying New York Times rule to "public
figures" involved in a public controversy). But cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974) (New York Times rule does not apply to defamation action by private person).
18. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (commercial speech provided first amendment protection to extent it provides
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gree of protection afforded commercial speech is less than that
provided other forms of speech; the government must meet a lesser
standard to justify restrictions on it. 19 Some forms of commercial
speech receive no protection and, as such, are totally subject to
governmental regulation. These forms of commercial speech include false facts, 20 misleading advertising,2 1 or advertisements in
which the transactions proposed are illegal. 2 In short, the first
amendment does not operate as an absolute ban on any regulation
of speech in this country. The network of broadcast regulation today perfectly illustrates this concept.
2.

Applicability of First Amendment Law to Broadcasting

The rapid development of radio technology in the 1920's
prompted the government to enact a comprehensive regulatory
scheme for the communications industry.2 3 In 1927 Congress enacted the Radio Act,2 4 which created a five-member Federal Radio
Commission (FRC) vested with comprehensive licensing and regulatory powers.2 5 The continued technological progress in communiinformation of public interest).
19. The government must show that the regulation directly advances the interest asserted, that it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest, and that it has a
substantial state interest in the regulation. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (first amendment prohibits ban on promotional advertising by
utility).
20. The first amendment never has protected false facts. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
21. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (state may bar optometrists' use of trade
name because of interest in protecting public from being misled).
22. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (advertisements promoting sex-based discrimination in employment illegal and subject to state
regulation).
23. The government had tried to regulate radio on a piecemeal basis as early as in the
Wireless Ship Act of 1910, ch. 379, 36 Stat. 629 (repealed 1934) (prohibited ships carrying
50 or more passengers from leaving American ports without radio communication equipment). In 1912 Congress enacted the first Radio Act, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (repealed
1927), which required all radio operators to obtain a license from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The technological advances brought on by World War I accelerated development of the radio business and filled the broadcast spectrum with scores of stations. Since
the 1912 Act did not set aside frequencies for private broadcasting stations, the broadcasters
often interfered with each other on the spectrum; chaos, consequently, reigned in the industry. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-216 (1942) (historical
discussion of radio regulation).
24. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934).
25. The primary duty of the Commission was to limit the number of stations in the
broadcasting spectrum. At the time Congress passed the Act, 200 new stations were on the
air, broadcasting on whatever frequency they chose. National BroadcastingCo., 319 U.S. at
212 ("With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard.").
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cations revealed the ineffectiveness of the Radio Act and prompted
the passage of the Communications Act of 1934,26 which established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).27 Congress
charged the FCC to license radio broadcasters in the "public interest, convenience, and necessity."2 s
While the first amendment protects broadcasted speech as
well as other forms of speech, the protection of broadcasted speech
has been different from that provided the printed or unamplified
spoken word. Because the airwaves are a public resource and the
space on the broadcasting spectrum is limited, 9 the government
may license broadcasters, assign broadcasting frequencies to selected broadcasters, require that certain issues be aired, and mandate limited rights of access to the airwaves by the public.30
The fairness doctrine" 1 is one example of governmental control
of broadcasting content. This doctrine has two parts: The first requires the broadcaster to air issues of public importance; the second requires the broadcaster to present contrasting views on those
controversial issues that he chooses to air. 2 Also included in the
26. Ch. 657, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
27. Congress incorporated portions of the 1927 Act into the 1934 Act. The Supreme
Court characterized the new Communications Act as an effort "to protect the national interest involved in the new and far-reaching science of broadcasting." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
28. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a), 310, 312 (1976). The Supreme Court has interpreted "public interest, convenience, and necessity" to include "the ability of the licensee to
render the best practicable service to the community reached by his broadcasts." FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
29. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969); see generally Rosenfeld, The Jurisprudenceof Fairness:Freedom Through Regulation in the Marketplace
of Ideas, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 877 (1976) (discussion of the underlying philosophical bases of
"free speech" and the best means of attaining it in the broadcast media context).
30. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The FRC
established that "the public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of
opposing views" on all discussions of issues important to the public. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. 32, 33 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993, cert. denied, 281 U.S.
706 (1930). The FCC adopted this policy of fair and balanced broadcasting, enforcing it
through denial of license renewals or construction permits. See, e.g., Young People's Ass'n
for Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938).
31. See Communications Act of 1934, § 309(a), 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
32. Red Lion Broadcasting,395 U.S. at 377. The FCC has issued numerous reports on
the fairness doctrine and its application. See, e.g., The Handling of Public Issues under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30
F.C.C.2d 26 (1971); Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial
Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964); Report and Statement of Policy re:
Comm'n en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960); Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949); see also Comment, Enforcing the Obligation to Present
Controversial Issues: The Forgotten Half of the Fairness Doctrine, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 138 (1975). See Note, FCC Regulation of BroadcastNews: First Amendment Perils of
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fairness doctrine is the requirement that a broadcaster must give a
person an opportunity to respond on the air if another party has
maligned the person during a program discussing a controversial
issue of public importance."
Additional access regulation appears in the political sphere.
Any broadcaster that sells or gives time to a political candidate
must offer equal treatment to all other candidates for the same
office.3 A candidate triggers this requirement when he personally
appears during the program. 5 In addition, the broadcaster must
for fedprovide "reasonable access" to a legally qualified candidate
36
eral office who wants to purchase political advertising.
The FCC also regulates obscene, offensive, or indecent
speech37 broadcast over the air, but the Commission may not act as
a "censor." 3 8 As an example of the Commission's power in this context, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's censure of a station for
indecent language broadcast in a satiric monologue on a weekday
afternoon.' The timing of the broadcast made it available to children, and the pervasive nature of the broadcast media created an
intrusion into the privacy of the home.40
Conflicting Standards of Review, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1227 (1980), for a discussion of the
fairness doctrine's applicability to broadcast news reporting.
33. 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1983) (the "personal attack" rule). The FCC recently proposed
that Congress amend the Communications Act to repeal the fairness doctrine and "equal
time" provisions. For a discussion of the likely outcome of FCC content deregulation, see
Student Symposium, The Future of Content Regulation in Broadcasting, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
555 (1981).
34. Communications Act of 1934, § 315, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976).
35. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 1, 2-3 (3d Cir. 1951). Equal
opportunity, however, does not apply to the broadcaster's coverage of a bona fide news
event. Communications Act of 1934, § 315(a), 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976).
36. Communications Act of 1934, § 312(a)(7), 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976). The FCC
will defer to the broadcaster's judgment if his decision is reasonable and made in good faith.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 386-88 (1981).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). The FCC has used its authority to impose sanctions
against programming that it judged obscene. Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d
777 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (FCC constitutionally can adjudge obscene a radio call-in show broadcasting explicit discussions of sexual acts in titillating context during daytime hours).
38. Communications Act of 1934, § 326, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
39. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
40. Id. at 738-41, 748-50. Persuasive arguments have been made that the Court's rationale in this type of content regulation simply is inadequate. The listener "invites" the
content into his home by turning on his set; he can avoid offensiveness by turning off the
set. Also, the "child" involved in the sole complaint by a listener was seventeen years old.
See id. at 764-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Shinners, Offensive Personal Product
Advertising on the Broadcast Media: Can it be Constitutionally Censored?, 34 FED. COM.
L.J. 49 (1982) (analyzing Pacifica in context of commercial advertising restrictions). The
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The fairness doctrine, the equal opportunity provision, the
reasonable access requirements, and obscene broadcast regulation
represent a delicate balance between the protections of the first
amendment and the obligations of a broadcaster operating in the
public interest."1 No matter how delicate, however, these requirements do constitute a significant restriction upon a broadcaster's
choice of program content. The United States Supreme Court has
refused to extend this content regulation to the printed media.4 2
The courts base the disparate treatment of broadcasters and publishers on the limited space of the broadcasting spectrum and the
characterization of the airwaves as a public resource.43
3.

DBS and the First Amendment

Because the FCC does not regulate DBS as a separate entity,
the same regulatory regimes will apply to it as apply to other limited access broadcasting, such as cable systems. The primary remaining regulation on cable systems is the "must carry" rule,
which requires cablecasters to carry all local stations within thirtyfive miles of the system's community." The FCC has eliminated
restrictions on pay cable systems, however, because it lacked jurisdiction over systems that did not transmit initially over scarce
spectrum resources or retransmit programs originally broadcast
over the air. 45 Similarly, the FCC policy, and federal statute, proscribing "obscene, indecent, and profane" language over the airFCC, however, has limited the impact of Pacificain subsequent policy statements. See In re
WGBH Educational Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978) (stressing repetitive occurrence of words in Pacifica);Petition for Clarification or Reconsideration of a Citizen's Complaint against Pacifica Foundation, 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1971) (broadcaster not responsible for
offensive speech uttered during coverage of a news event when no time for editing). See also
Gard & Endress, The Impact of Pacifica Foundation on Two Traditions of Freedom of
Expression, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 465 (1978).
41. For example, even when the FCC requires the broadcaster to provide access, the
broadcaster may charge for that access. Communications Act of 1934, § 315(b), 47 U.S.C. §
315(b) (1976). For 45 days before a primary and 60 days before a general election, the candidate must receive the lowest advertising rate the station offers. At all other times, he is to be
charged no more than the comparable rate to other advertisers. Id. Moreover, a broadcaster
may opt not to accept editorial advertising. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
42. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. TornrUo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
43. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
44. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b)-(e), 76.61(b)-(f), 76.63 (1980); Revision of Cable Television Rules Regarding Leapfrogging, Carriage of Local Independent Signals, and Non-Network Programming Exclusivity, 87 F.C.C.2d 580 (1981).
45. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977).
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waves does not apply to cablecasters. 46 The courts emphasize the
choice available to the listener as the basis for striking down attempts to regulate the distribution of indecent programming over
cable. 47 The viewer can "avert his eyes" by not inviting (subscribing to) the service. Since DBS transmits directly to the viewer, regulation of obscenity is still an open issue. The FCC has stated that
it will regulate cablecasters as broadcasters to the extent that cable
systems originate programming and broadcast it over the air.48
B. Regulation of DBS in the United States
On June 23, 1982, the FCC pursuant to Title III of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, promulgated Interim Rules
for the licensing and operation of DBS.49 These rules were to govern the authorization of DBS services on an experimental basis until the July 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference
(RARC) in Geneva, Switzerland. The purpose of the Conference,
which the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) sponsored, was to plan the orbit and to allocate frequencies for DBS in
the Western Hemisphere.
The FCC's DBS policy is "to maintain an open and flexible
approach that will allow the business judgments of the individual
applicants to shape the character of the services offered. ' 50 The
Commission hopes that this "open skies policy [will] encourage the
submission of a wide variety of proposals" and, consequently, afford the public the "full benefits of experimentation with this new
service."' 51 The FCC believes that a flexible regulatory approach is
in the public interest during the experimental phase of DBS opera46.
1982).
47.

Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah
Id. But see Notice of Proposed Rule Making in MM Docket 83-331, F.C.C. Release

No. 83-130, at 10-11 (May 25, 1983) (issue of whether Congress intended to subject cable

systems to fairness doctrine and equal time requirements).
48. Amendment of Part 76 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations Concerning the
Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of Section 76.251, 87
F.C.C.2d 40 (1981). The FCC always has regulated "common carriers" differently than
broadcasters. Common carriers may not refuse service to anyone based on transmission con-

tent. Communications Act of 1934, § 201(a), 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976). The Commission now
is considering whether it can and should regulate the content of common carrier transmissions that may be indecent or obscene. Notice of Inquiry, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,348 (1983) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. 1) (proposed Sept. 23, 1983). This proposal would affect leased

access through DBS.
49.

Interim Rules, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,574 (1982) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 100).

50. Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 698 (1982).
51.

Id.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:67

tion for several reasons: the hands-off approach "will allow operators . . . to experiment with service offerings to find the [offerings]
that the public needs and wants"; the selected approach permits
experimentation "with technical and organizational characteristics"; and an unintrusive FCC policy will allow the Commission "to
gather information about the operation of the industry, . . [and]
to make better-informed decisions about permanent regulatory
policies. ' 52 A more restrictive approach, in contrast, might constrain prematurely the evolution of DBS services and increase the
costs and risks to DBS operators in developing this new technology. These constraints might reduce the ability of DBS operators
to attract financing and, thus, decrease the probability that the
private sector will undertake DBS ventures. 3 Thus, the Interim
Rules impose a minimum number of regulatory requirements on
applicants for licenses to operate DBS systems.4 The FCC, however, did retain the option to impose further regulation once the
systems are operational, if experience with the DBS systems shows
55
that increased regulation is necessary.
1.

Background of DBS Regulation

The FCC formally began consideration of domestic policies for
DBS with a Notice of Inquiry released October 29, 1980.56 The Notice of Inquiry requested comment from the industry on two Commission staff reports-one discussing DBS technical characteristics
and the other analyzing long-range regulatory policies. The Commission also requested comment on the nature of regulations and
policies that should apply to the industry in the interim period
prior to the 1983 RARC. Two months later the FCC received an
application from Satellite Television Corporation (STC), a subsidiary of the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), for
authority to begin construction of satellites for a satellite-to-home
video broadcasting system. By the summer of 1981, the FCC had
issued its recommendations for the interim period in a Notice of
Proposed Policy Statement and Rulemaking (Notice).57 When the
Commission issued this Notice, it accepted STC's application for
filing and established a forty-five day cutoff period for the submis52.

Id. at 707-08.

53. Id.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See infra part II, section B, subsection 2.
Report and Order, supra note 50, at 708.
Notice of Inquiry, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,719 (1980).
86 F.C.C.2d 719 (1981). The FCC issued this Notice on June 1, 1981.
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sion of other applications that the Commission would consider
with STC's application.5 8 The Commission received thirteen additional applications during the ensuing forty-five days. The FCC accepted seven applications for filing, partially accepted one application, and rejected five applications as incomplete and unacceptable
59
for filing.
2.

The Interim Rules

One of the issues confronting the FCC was whether to authorize the initiation of DBS systems before the 1983 RARC, even
though the outcome of the RARC might affect the FCC rules. An
ancillary concern was that any authorization of DBS systems prior
to the 1983 RARC would restrict the negotiating flexibility of the
United States at the RARC or predetermine the nation's permanent policies and regulations. The FCC concluded, however, that
its approval of one or more DBS applications would not affect adversely the negotiating position of the United States at the RARC.
The Commission found that the existence of definite DBS proposals might assist in formulating realistic United States proposals for
presentation at the RARC6 0 The FCC also clearly stated that the
spectrum allocation and rules for licensing set forth in the Interim
Rules were all subject to revision based upon the outcome of the
RARC. The revision most likely to affect the American situation
would have been if the RARC had limited the United States to
fewer spectrum-orbits than the FCC already had allocated to its
approved applicants. Accordingly, the Interim Rules put all applicants on notice that approval of their systems was conditioned
upon the outcome of the RARC and that if spectrum or orbital
positions were not available for all the systems authorized, the
FCC might force applicants to go through comparative hearings or
assign applicants fewer frequencies or orbital positions different
from the positions requested. Further, the FCC decided that it
would not assign frequencies or orbital positions until the conclusion of the RARC.8 1 Finally, the FCC stated that it would require
58. Interim Direct Broadcast Satellite Applications, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,497 (1981).
59. Advance, Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d 100 (1981).
60. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 684.
61. Interim Rules, supra note 49, at 31,575 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 100.13(b)).
In fact, the Final Acts of the RARC assigned to the United States 32 channels at each of
eight orbital positions and thus eliminated any need for the FCC to consider comparative
issues or to apply other selection procedures in the further processing of the first round of
DBS applications. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 83-451, F.C.C.2d-
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all operators of interim DBS systems to come into compliance with
any permanent regulations that the FCC or RARC implements
subsequently. 2
The Interim Rules that the FCC promulgated to regulate DBS
service added a new Part 100, entitled "Direct Broadcast Satellite
Service," to Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations.6 In addition, the FCC amended the table of frequency allocations appearing in Part 2 of Title 47 by allocating to DBS a 500 MHz range in
the 12.2-12.7 GHz frequency band for downlinks from space to
earth, and a 500 MHz range in the 17.3-17.8 GHz frequency band
for feeder links from earth to space.64 The FCC also amended Part
94 of Title 47 to cope with the interference that will occur between
DBS and private operational-fixed microwave service (FS). 5
Four subparts compose the new Part 100. Subpart A sets forth
the basis and purpose of the Interim Rules-to prescribe the manner in which the Commission may make available parts of the radio frequency spectrum for the development of broadcast satellite
service prior to the adoption of permanent rules. 66 The Rules define DBS service as "[a] radiocommunication service in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended
for direct reception by the general public."67 Direct reception, for
the purposes of DBS, encompasses both individual and community
reception." Subpart B sets forth eligibility requirements and licensing procedures for DBS systems. The only eligibility restriction in Subpart B is the prevention of foreign ownership or control
(Oct. 7, 1983), at 2 n.4.
In the Memorandum Opinion and Order, the FCC stated that it neither will reserve nor
grant specific orbital locations and frequency assignments to an individual permittee until
such permittee complies with the due diligence requirement. Id. at 4. The FCC will make
such assignments, then, on a first-come, first-served basis. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. Moreover, the FCC will assign no specific orbital positions or channels to secondround permittees before July 17, 1984, unless all first-round permittees have demonstrated
due diligence before that date.
62. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 684. For a discussion of the results of RARC83, see infra notes 219-27 and accompanying text.
63. Interim Rules, supra note 49, at 31,574-76.
64. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 720-22. The 12 GHz band "is the only band of
spectrum allocated internationally to DBS for which technology will be available" in the
near future. Id. at 698. The FCC RARC-83 Advisory Committee has estimated that the
United States will need between 65 and 207 channels by the year 2000 for DBS services.
The 500 MHz allocation is based on that estimate. Id.
65. Id. at 721-22. See infra text accompanying notes 102-05.
66. Interim Rules, supra note 49, at 31,574 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 100.1(b)).
67. Id. at 31,574-75 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 100.3).
68. Id.
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of DBS stations."9 The types of ownership restrictions applicable
to terrestrial broadcasting entities do not appear in the Interim
Rules with respect to DBS. 0
The licensing procedures constitute the bulk of Subpart B.
Applications for an interim DBS system must describe the type of
service that the applicant will provide and the technology that the
applicant will employ.71 As long as frequencies and orbital slots remain available for assignment, the FCC plans to treat all frequencies and orbital positions within the relevant frequency range as
having equal value to prevent conflicts from arising over a particular frequency or orbital position.7 2 Comparative hearings among
applicants, then, should not be necessary. The licensing procedures
require a forty-five day period for public comment on each application, after which the FCC will determine whether authorization of
the proposed system is in the public interest.7 3 The license term
for an interim DBS system is five years. 4 Policies and rules that
the FCC subsequently adopts may modify the terms and conditions of granted licenses. In most circumstances, however, the regulatory policies in force at the time of the grant will remain in effect for the system throughout its operating lifetime. 5
The Interim Rules impose a diligence requirement for the construction of authorized DBS systems. Permittees must start construction, or at least complete contracting for construction, of the
satellite station within one year of the grant of the construction
permit, and an authorized satellite station must be operational
within six years of the grant of the construction permit unless the
permittee makes an adequate showing that the FCC should grant
an exception. 6
69. Id. at 31,575 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 100.11).
70. Compare 47 C.F.R. § 100.11 (1982) with 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a)(1) (1982) (prohibiting ownership of more than one television station in a single market) and 47 C.F.R. §
73.636(a)(2) (1982) (limiting the total number of television stations that any one entity may
own).

71. 47 C.F.R. § 100.13(a) (1982).
72. Id. § 100.13(b).
73. Id. § 100.15. The Interim Rules also provide for the establishment of a 45 day cutoff period for the filing of applications that the FCC will consider in conjunction with the
original application from STC. The FCC will consider these applications to have equal priority with the STC application. Applications filed after that cut-off date will have lower
priority in the event of conflicting requests for frequencies or other orbital positions.
74. Id. § 100.17.
75. Id. § 100.19(a).
76. Id. § 100.19(b). The FCC waived the one-year due-diligence-in-construction requirement of 47 C.F.R. § 100.19(b) (1982) for all existing first-round permittees and instead
substituted July 17, 1984, as the date by which the due diligence requirement must be met.
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Subpart C of Part 100 contains the technical requirements applicable to interim DBS systems licensed under the Interim Rules.
The Commission has imposed no technical standards other than
the requirements now contained in applicable international agreements. These requirements include the technical characteristics
contained in Annexes 8 and 9 of the Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of the Broadcasting-Satellite Service in Frequency Bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1), adopted in Geneva
in 1977. Nonetheless, the Interim Rules permit systems to depart
from the technical characteristics specified in the Final Acts, upon
adequate showing, if the result does not interfere excessively with
other operational or planned systems.7 In short, apart from international requirements, DBS operators will be free to determine the
characteristics of the system that they use and the services that
they offer.
Subpart D contains the equal employment opportunity requirements, which are the same as the requirements that apply to
radio and television broadcasters. 8
3.

Bases for Finding a Public Interest

In deciding whether to authorize interim DBS systems, the
FCC made a preliminary determination that DBS services on a
regular or permanent basis would serve the public interest.7 9 The
Commission found that DBS had the potential to serve the public
interest in five distinct ways: (1) DBS could provide service to remote areas currently with little or no television service;8 0 (2) DBS
Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 61, at 4, 6.

77. Id. § 100.21.
78. Id. § 100.51; 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1982).
79. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 678. The Notice contained such a preliminary
determination of public interest. Notice of Proposed Policy Statement and Rulemaking, 86
F.C.C.2d 719, 728-29 (1981). The Commission similarly found that authorization of DBS

systems in the 12.2-12.7 GHz band would serve the public interest. Report and Order,
supra, note 50, at 679.

80. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 680. The DBS contribution would further the
statutory goal of providing an equitable distribution of television service throughout the
nation. Estimates of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) of the United States Department of Commerce show that in 1973 almost five million people lived in areas in which they could not receive any over-the-air television signals.
The Nielsen rating service has estimated that in 1981 approximately eleven million people
received three or fewer channels. Id. at nn.9-10. The FCC, therefore, concluded that for
isolated households in the United States, satellite technology seems to offer the only new
source of television service likely to be practical in the foreseeable future, with the possible
exception of low power television and video cassette and disc equipment. Id. at 680.
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would make available additional channels of television programming throughout the country; s (3) DBS systems could bring individualized programming to viewers by tailoring programs to small
audiences with specialized tastes; 2 (4) DBS systems could provide
innovative services such as high definition television (HDTV), stereophonic sound, teletext, and dual-language sound tracks;"s and
(5) DBS systems could provide a variety of nonentertainment services, including educational programming and transmission of
medical data.84 The Commission balanced these potential benefits
of the new technology with the possible disadvantages of DBS and
concluded that the advantages of DBS clearly predominate.
4. Consideration of Possible Adverse Effects
Critics have cited three potential disadvantages to the FCC's
facilitation of DBS. The first concerned the effect of authorizing
DBS systems before the 1983 RARC. The FCC concluded that no
serious disadvantage would arise from interim authorization on an
experimental basis before the RARC allocates frequencies. 8 5 As described below, 6 the RARC results confirmed the FCC's judgment
that the RARC would not cause significant damage to its interim
authorizations. The other two often-cited concerns are the impact
of DBS systems on existing terrestrial broadcasting service and the
interference of DBS systems with terrestrial FS operations now us81. Id. at 681. The high prices for which television stations in urban areas have been
selling suggested to the Commission that great unmet demand exists for television channels
in urban areas. The United States obtained spectrum space for an additional 32 channels
nationwide at RARC-83. See infra text accompanying note 220.
82. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 681. The FCC found that the amount and
quality of programming now available is limited because of the small number of outlets that
produce original programming. If subscription programming becomes widely available and if
many new outlets begin competing for audiences and advertising revenues, the FCC would
expect to see a substantial increase in the funds spent on program production. Id. at 682.
83. Id. Many of the submitted applications for DBS systems proposed innovative services. The FCC stated that the flexible regulatory and spectrum allocation provisions contained in the Interim Rules and the Report and Order would allow for the authorization of
such innovative services. Id.
84. Id. Although the FCC expects DBS operators to provide nonentertainment services if the demand exists, the Commission does not intend to reserve channels for such
services.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62. The United States did obtain eight orbital positions, each with 500 MHz of spectrum space, at RARC-83, as well as adoption of
most of the technical parameters it had proposed. The location of the eight orbital positions,
however, was not what it had sought. See infra text accompanying notes 219-227.
86. See infra notes 219-27 and accompanying text.
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ing the 12 GHz band. 7 In its response to these concerns, the FCC
has emphasized the value of making DBS services available to the
public as soon as possible, both because of the benefits that such
services can provide and because of the experiential information
the Commission and industry can gain from the interim systems.'
(a) Impact on Local Broadcasting
The FCC had to resolve two issues on the relationship of DBS
to local broadcasting: First, whether the FCC has authority to authorize nonlocal broadcast services; and, second, the effect DBS
systems might have on local broadcasters' audiences, revenues, and
public service programming. The Commission deftly disposed of
the first issue. DBS systems will be structurally nonlocal, whereas
the Communications Act provides that: "[i]n considering applications for licenses ... the Commission shall make such distribution

of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among
the several states and communities as to provide a fair, efficient,
and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the same.""
The FCC, however, had concluded in the Notice and reaffirmed in
a Report and Order that it does have the authority to authorize
nonlocal broadcast service.90 The statutory obligation is merely to
provide fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service
across the nation; the Commission adopted its policy of localism in
the regulation of radio and television by choice rather than by statutory command. 1 Moreover, the FCC considers the statutory mandate to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio"'' as
obligating it to utilize the satellite technology that DBS offers to
improve services to underserved areas of the nation.2
The second issue-the impact of DBS on local broadcasters-is more critical because of its economic implications. Understandably, local broadcasters submitted many comments concerning this issue in response to the Notice."4 Some broadcasters
argued that competition from DBS systems would cause them to
87. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 684-92.
88. See, e.g., id. at 692, 697-98.
89. Communications Act of 1934, § 307(b), 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1976).
90. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 686; Notice of Proposed Policy Statement and
Rulemaking, 86 F.C.C.2d 719, 736-37 (1981).
91. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 686.
92. Communications Act of 1934, § 303(g), 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976).
93. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 686.
94. See id. at 686-88 nn.24-28 and accompanying text.
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reduce the amount or quality of locally produced programming and
public service programming. Others argued that advertiser supported DBS systems would compete directly with terrestrial broadcasters for audiences and advertising revenues, bidding against
them for premium programming and thus increasing the price and
reducing the quality of programming available to advertiser supported and public television stations. Another fear was a negative
effect on advertising revenues and on fund raising abilities of public television stations arising from the DBS subscription systems'
attraction of affluent viewers away from existing broadcasters."5
The National Association of Broadcasters and the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting also argued that programming provided by
DBS systems could not address local needs and would not replace
adequately the local programming that might be lost. In response
to these complaints, the FCC has reviewed numerous market and
economic studies on the effect of DBS systems on existing broadcasters under a number of scenarios.98 The Commission, while conceding that little reliable evidence exists on the probable effects of
DBS on the audiences and revenues of local broadcasters, has concluded that
[t]he record developed in this proceeding does not support a finding that

DBS is likely to have a substantial adverse impact on local services....
[N]either the comments nor any other evidence we have seen has shown that
DBS systems would have so detrimental an effect on existing service as to
justify our choosing not to authorize the service on an experimental basis.'9

Citing FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station9 8 and Carroll
BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,99 the Commission asserted in the Report
and Order that the FCC is required to consider the economic effect
of a new service on existing broadcasters only if strong evidence
exists that a significant net reduction in service to the public will
result. Moreover, the Commission cannot reject a new service
solely because its entry will reduce the revenues or profits of existing licensees. 100 Finally, the Commissioners concluded that
claims of adverse effects from DBS were too speculative to block
the authorization of a service that has so many potential benefits-particularly the capability to provide service to underserved
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 686-87.
See, e.g., id. at 688 nn.29-30, 705 n.69.
Id. at 691.
309 U.S. 470 (1940).

99. 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
100. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 689.
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areas. 10 1
(b) Spectrum Sharing Problems
The FCC also confronted complaints that a conflict could arise
between future DBS operators and the present users of FS operations in the 12 GHz band.1 0 2 Currently, the FCC licenses about
1900 private microwave links in that band. Local governments,
banks, newspapers, railroads, utility companies, universities, and
others use these systems because of particular needs for greater
bandwidths, congestion in the lower frequencies, or FCC rules
prohibiting their access to lower frequency bands.10 3 The FS operations in the 12 GHz band very likely will interfere with reception
of DBS signals.
The FCC seeks to resolve this potential conflict by providing
for a transition period during which DBS and FS operators will
have coequal status. This equal status, however, will be temporary;
FS operators must prepare for a move to another band by replacing equipment and taking other necessary steps. In the meantime,
the FCC has conducted a rulemaking to determine the other bands
in the frequency spectrum that will be available and capable of
utilization by FS operators and to consider the possibilities of
pooling microwave frequency spectrum between various types of
users. The Commission issued a report based on the rulemaking
shortly after the conclusion of the RARC. With respect to the temporary accommodation of both FS and DBS operations on the 12
GHz band, during the five-year period ending September 4, 1988,
the FCC will not require FS operations authorized before September 4, 1983, to protect domestic DBS reception from interference.
The FCC will require that terrestrial operations licensed after September 4, 1983, and all FS operations licensed after September 4,
1988, operate on a strict noninterference basis and make any and
all adjustments necessary to prevent interference to operating DBS
systems.'0 4 During the five-year period that DBS operators will
have to accommodate existing FS operations, the Report and Or101. Id. at 691-92.
102. Id. at 692-706.
103. Id. at 699.
104. Id. at 702; 47 C.F.R. § 94.65(h) (1982). The report referred to above adopted a
final rule to provide frequencies and revised rules for the reaccommodation of existing 12
GHz fixed microwave users who will be displaced by DBS service. See First Report and
Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 50,722 (1983). The rule changes permit the displaced links access to the
following bands: 6525-6875 MHz, 12.7-13.2 GHz, and 17.7-19.7 GHz.
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der suggests various options for DBS operators to pursue, among
them: agreements with terrestrial station operators, and adequate
replacement of terrestrial equipment. Although the FCC will not
require DBS operators to pay the costs of relocating FS operations,
they may have a "strong incentive to compensate the FS users for
the costs of moving to other frequency bands during this
period."' 105
5.

Flexible Regulatory Approach

An intriguing aspect of the FCC's action on DBS authorization
is its adoption of a "flexible regulatory approach." 10 6 The actual
result of the flexible approach is to allow DBS operators, for the
moment at least, to function essentially without regulation. That
the FCC has chosen this highly technological area of telecommunications in which to try out a free market approach is at least noteworthy in view of the enormous sums of money required to finance
DBS systems and the logistical steps required to get a system up
and operating. The rationale for this deferential approach undoubtedly is to expedite the introduction of DBS service and to
allow operators to experiment to find the most desirable service
offerings. A brief examination of several facets of the regulatory
scheme illustrates the unintrusive nature of the "flexible"
approach.
The Commission declined to require DBS systems to operate
under a particular service classification during this developmental
and experimental stage. In other words, the FCC will not classify
DBS operators as broadcasters, common carriers, private radio operators, or some combination or variant of these classifications.10 7
Nonetheless, once the DBS operator decides how it is going to operate, the FCC will impose the applicable statutory requirements.
For example, the FCC probably will treat an applicant proposing
to provide direct-to-home service and to retain control over the
content of the transmissions as a broadcaster and subject it to the
broadcasting provisions of Title III of the Communications Act. 10 8
If, instead, a DBS operator proposes to operate as a common carrier (without providing the programming itself), the Commission
will require the DBS operator to offer its satellite transmission ser105.

Report and Order, supra note 50, at 702 n.60.

106. Id. at 706.
107. Id. at 708-09.
108.

See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Report and Order, supra note 50, at
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vices indiscriminately to the public pursuant to the tariff under
Title II of the Communications Act.10 9 Alternatively, a DBS operator may function as a broadcaster with respect to some of its channels and as a common carrier with respect to others.1 10 Interestingly, the FCC has declined to license the customers of DBS
common carriers as broadcasters, although it has retained the discretion to apply appropriate regulatory constraints if circumstances suggest their necessity."'
The Commission also decided not to impose any restrictions
on multiple ownership or control of DBS systems. 1 2 The FCC expects considerable competition among DBS systems and, thus,
does not think that multiple-ownership restrictions are necessary.
Moreover, industry observers expect many alternative video services to be available by the time DBS systems go into operation;
consequently, the FCC contemplates sufficient competition to prevent monopolistic pricing or other abuses of market power. Of
course, the antitrust laws exist to prevent excessive horizontal concentration.1 1 3 In short, the FCC feels that interim restrictions on
multiple ownership or control of DBS channels are unnecessary to
assure diversity of sources of programming.1
The Interim Rules impose no access requirements on DBS
licensees operating as broadcasters other than the limitations required by Title II of the Communications Act on common carrier
DBS operators. The FCC concluded that DBS licensees probably
will have ample economic incentives to offer services that the public most desires and needs without any formal access requirements. 11 5 Similarly, the Commission declined to adopt rules imposing program content requirements or otherwise ensuring that DBS
programming is responsive to viewer needs. 11 6
Finally, the technical requirements in the Interim Rules consist only of the technical guidelines specified in the WARC-77 Final Acts, conditioned by the outcome of RARC-83.117 Specifically,
the rules impose no compatibility standards; DBS operators, thus,
109. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1976). Report and Order, supra note 50, at 709.
110. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 709.
111. Id. at 709-11.
112. Id. at 711-13.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 714.
116. Id. at 714-15. The FCC declined to follow CBS' advice and exclude DBS systems
using conventional broadcast services from the 12 GHz band.
117. See infra notes 219-27 and accompanying text.
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will be free to offer new services in response to advances in technology or changes in viewer's tastes. Similarly, operators may offer
either HDTV, conventional television signals, or both. 118 The FCC,
however, did promise to examine carefully interim applications to
ensure that technical proposals efficiently utilize the orbit and frequency resources and are flexible enough to assure the Commission
of the applicants' ability to accommodate any permanent rules or
technical standards.11 9
6. Analysis of Current Applications for Proposed DBS Services
Shortly after deciding to provide an environment for DBS free
of regulatory impediments, the Commission turned its attention to
the applicants seeking to provide DBS service. On September 23,
1982, the Commission granted the application of the Satellite Television Corporation (STC), a subsidiary of COMSAT, to construct
and operate a DBS system. The Commission on November 4, 1982,
issued conditional construction permits to seven other DBS applicants: CBS, Inc.; DBSC; Graphic; RCA; USSB; Videosat; and
Western Union. The Commission's action authorizes the eight approved applicants to commence preparations for the initial phases
of their proposed services. The assignment of frequencies and orbital positions was confirmed largely by the outcome of the 1983 Region 2 Administrative Radio Conference (RARC-83). 120 This subsection discusses the services that the eight approved applicants
have proposed and attempts to assess the proposals in terms of the
principles that the Commission cited in its Report and Order.
118. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 715-18.
119. Id. at 717. The Final Acts of the RARC include international technical parameters of DBS systems, orbital locations, channel utilization requirements, and international
procedures required for plan modification and DBS system implementation by individual
administrations. The FCC adopted a Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 61, to
set forth procedures for further processing of proposals for the establishment of DBS systems in light of the conclusion of the RARC. The Memorandum Opinion and Order requires
DBS permittees and other applicants to conform their applications to the Final Acts of the
RARC or to demonstrate how their proposals can be made consistent with the technical and
procedural parameters of the RARC agreement. The FCC intends to use the plan that the
RARC adopted regarding utilization of assignments specified for use by the United States as
the primary basis for domestic utilization of the DBS service. The Memorandum Opinion
and Order stated that the FCC expects that United States licensees will wish to take full
advantage of the significant technical flexibility provided by the RARC plan to permittees
seeking to implement systems that vary from, but are not inconsistent with, the technical
parameters in the plan.
120. See infra notes 219-27 and accompanying text.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:67

(a) Service to Consumers with Limited Television Exposure
The FCC immediately recognized that DBS could improve
service to households with access to fewer than three television stations.121 These households tend to be concentrated in the Western
Mountain States. Under the current schemes set forth by the applicants, Graphic, Videosat, USSB, and Western Union plan to of12
fer initial service to the Western and Mountain time zones. 2
Graphic's broadcasts will include entertainment and informational
programming delivered in conventional National Television System Committee (NTSC) service. 2 3 Graphic expects to offer subscriptions to individual homeowners for $24.95 per month after an
initial installation charge of $300. When fully operational the system would include options
to purchase stereophonic and second
1 24
capabilities.
language
USSB will offer its programming to independent broadcasters-first to full'service stations, then to low-power stations. The
consumer may choose to receive from the broadcaster or directly
from the satellite. USSB will offer advertiser supported entertainment on its first channel to supplement those programs that local
broadcasters produce; the second channel will offer twenty-four
hour news service. 2 5 By distributing its programming to independent television stations, USSB hopes to make the independents
fully competitive with the network affiliates. 2 6 USSB plans to
broadcast in conventional NTSC, but expects to help develop
HDTV and use it when this innovative video service becomes
127
feasible.
Videosat also hopes to offer advertiser supported programming to broadcasters and individual households. Households, however, will receive direct satellite broadcasts only in areas not served
by Videosat broadcasters. Videosat's affiliate, Dominion Satellite
121. Report and Order, supra note 50, at 680.
122. In re Application of Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 92 F.C.C.2d 64, 74-79
(1982). On January 3, 1983, the FCC received a Petition for Clarification from DBSC.
Among its requests, DBSC asked for an order allowing it to transmit to more of the continental United States than the originally granted eastern half.
123. The National Television System Committee (NTSC) set the standard of 525
scanning lines for television receivers. For a comparison of NTSC and high definition television (HDTV), see infra note 148 and accompanying text.
124. 92 F.C.C.2d at 74.
125. Id. at 76-77.
126. Good News, Bad News in DBS Spacerush, BROADCASTING, July 20, 1981, at 23,
24.
127. 92 F.C.C.2d at 77.
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Network, will produce the news and entertainment programming
that Videosat plans to offer. Videosat will transmit NTSC signals
and does not propose to introduce HDTV. The application reveals
that Videosat plans to offer some satellite space to other
programmers.1 28
Western Union will make its capabilities open to other programmers. Because it will broadcast others' programs, Western
Union does not describe the types of services it may offer or
whether advertisers or subscribers will support the broadcasts. Initially, Western Union plans to deliver programming in NTSC signals, but the company may offer HDTV if the technology becomes
12 9
feasible.
Ultimately, all applicants propose to service the television-deficient Western and Mountain time zones. 13 0 Nonetheless, the consumers in these regions will not receive the full benefit of DBS
until the 1990's.131 Further, although DBS may offer improved service for these households immediately, it may not be the panacea
that the FCC announced. Whether consumers will spend up to
$1,000 for an antenna plus installation and service fees is
uncertain.
(b) More Stations to Urban Households
Under the initial phase proposals that the FCC granted, viewers in the Eastern time zone fare quite well. Seven applicants in13 2
tend to provide initial service to the Eastern United States.
DBSC and RCA expect to lease their broadcasting capabilities to
individual programmers.1 3 3 While DBSC expects to offer advertiser
supported service, RCA does not comment on this issue.13 4 Both
RCA and DBSC will transmit NTSC signals, but RCA expects to
use HDTV when that technology becomes available.13 5 In addition,
RCA has noted that it may reserve satellite space for NBC, an
RCA company. 86
CBS plans to offer advertiser supported entertainment and in128.
129.
130.
F.C.C.2d
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 78.
Id. at 78-79.
Id. at 70-79; see also In re Application of Satellite Television Corporation, 91
953, 959 (1982).
None of the applicants expect to implement their second phase until 1990.
92 F.C.C.2d at 70-79; see also 91 F.C.C.2d at 958-59.
92 F.C.C.2d at 72, 75.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 75.
Id.
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formation programs on its first channel. The second channel will
supplement the first by offering special sports, cultural, and religious programming at a monthly or per-view charge. The third
channel will offer satellite-to-theater service and closed circuit service for business, educational, and medical institutions.13 7 CBS
hopes to offer these services in HDTV exclusively;138 the company,
thus, may be the primary innovator in this new technology.
STC will offer subscriber supported programming directly to
individual households. Although STC will transmit NTSC signals,
it plans a wide range of experimentation with HDTV services. " 9
STC describes its programming as counter-programming, meaning
that it will offer 0programs more diverse than the programs cur14
rently available.

The DBS applicants hope to offer twenty-six primary channels
to the Eastern United States.4 1 In all, seven of the eight applicants will provide initial service to the East, with four applicants
committed solely to the East during the initial phase.'4 2 The National Association of Broadcasters raises serious doubts concerning
the economic viability of these DBS channels. 4 3 The FCC, however, has dismissed this concern1" and believes, along with the various applicants, that these additional channels can compete successfully with cable and other subscription video services in urban
markets.
(c) Narrowcasting
45
The FCC also praised DBS for its potential "narrowcast"
capabilities, the ability to reach individualized audiences on a national scale. In narrowcasting, the transmitter aggregates isolated
groups too small and scattered for network programming. Programmers, therefore, would have an economic incentive to satisfy

137. Id. at 70-71.
138. Id. at 70.
139. 91 F.C.C.2d at 958.
140. Id. at 969..
141. The total includes: CBS-three, DBSC-six, RCA-six, USSB-three,
STC-three, Videosat-one, and Western Union-four.
142. Only Graphic will not provide service to the Eastern time zone. The four providing exclusive initial service are CBS, RCA, STC, and DBSC. DBSC has petitioned the FCC
to allow the company to provide initial service throughout the continental United States.
See supra note 122.
143. See 91 F.C.C.2d at 982-83.
144. Id. at 984-87.
145. Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 681 (1981).
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the particular tastes of specific audiences. DBS programming,
then, could prove an alternative to the least common denominator
approach that the networks practice. 14" Unfortunately, only the
STC application notes any attempt to produce this type of programming.1 47 The other applications contain only general headings
such as entertainment, information, or news. Of course, DBS will
not begin operation until 1986 and programmers may choose not to
predict audience tastes five years in advance. Nonetheless, that
only one applicant mentions narrowcasting as a goal or option during the initial phase is discouraging. The viability of DBS would
appear to depend on providing services different from those services already available.
(d) New Technologies
(1) High Definition Television
The most innovative service that DBS will provide is high definition television (HDTV). HDTV possesses several advantages
over conventional National Television System Committee (NTSC)
signals, including enhanced color reproduction, 48 improved
widescreen capabilities, and associated high quality stereophonic
sound.14' Current television sets cannot receive a HDTV signal, so
the consumer will need a converter or new receiver to utilize this
50
signal.
Of the eight applicants, only CBS intends to offer HDTV exclusively. DBSC, RCA, USSB, Western Union, and STC expect to
experiment with HDTV and ultimately to offer the service. CBS
sought to preserve the 12 GHz band exclusively for HDTV, but the
Commission felt that such a reservation would not promote the
most efficient use of the band.1 51 Instead, the Commission intends
to let the marketplace determine the band use with the FCC pro152
viding minimal regulation.
An FCC advisory committee has undertaken to determine the
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 681-82.
91 F.C.C.2d at 969.
HDTV would offer between 800-1500 horizontal scanning lines; NTSC offers 525.
WORKING GROUP 1-B SUBCOMM. 1 (SERVICE REQUIRms) or FCC AnvisoRy
COMM. ON DiRECT BROADCASTING SATELLrTEs, DRAFT REPORT 11 (Gen. Docket No. 80-398 vol.
4 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as DRFT REPORT].
150. Id. at 6; see also Fagan, Direct BroadcastSatellites and the FCC: A Case Study
in the Regulation of New Technology, 29 FED. B. NEws & J. 378, 383 n.34 (1982).
151. 92 F.C.C.2d at 90-91.
152. Id. at 91; 90 F.C.C.2d at 704-05.
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market for HDTV. A report by Kalba Bowen Associates predicts
that by 1984 7000 television receivers will have HDTV capability,
with the number increasing to 1.1 million by 1990.13 The report
expects demand for HDTV to explode ten to twelve years after its
introduction.' 5 By 1999 HDTV will stand as the broadcast standard, according to the study. 1 55 A report by Marder Associates for
CBS predicts that eighty percent of television consumers would replace their present television sets with HDTV models, even if the
price of the new models exceeded the price of current sets by fifty
percent. 15 6 On the other hand, a poll that Magid conducted for
USSB shows that sixty-three percent of consumers would not
purchase a new set if the cost rose to twice the cost of a conventional set. 157 The Magid study concludes that although consumers
react positively to HDTV, HDTV broadcasters would not find a
ready-made market and would have to stimulate demand.' All of
the studies, however, have come under severe attack. 159 Indeed, the
advisory group characterized the Kalba Bowen study as "overly
optimistic."' 6 0 Even considering the study as overly optimistic,
consumer demand based on the Kalba Bowen study would not
support the CBS HDTV system."" This is a sobering fact in light
of the failure of video disc cassettes to perform as well as
predicted." 2
(2) Teletext
DBS systems could become major suppliers of teletext transmissions. CBS expects to provide teletext services to hospitals and
153.

DRA T REPORT, supra note 149, at 22.

154. Id. at 24. The group based this projection on demand curves for FM radio and
color television.
155.

Id.

156. Id. at 34.
157. Id. at 30.
158. Id. at 31.
159. The Kalba Bowen study fails to consider any improvement in NTSC. In addition,
the report fails to consider a longer start-up time. CBS will broadcast only in the East

initially, and the price of the antenna may depress demand. Further, analogies to FM radio
and color television may be inappropriate. The Magid study was based on a telephone survey of 600 households. Paul Gerhold, an authority on market research, believed that the
questions were poor and cast a negative view on HDTV. The Marder poll was based on
respondents listed in the telephone directory. The study fails to account for respondents
who did not participate. This omission flaws the results because the respondents who did
participate may have had a major interest in television or television viewing. Id. at 25, 31.
160. Id. at 42.
161.

Id. at 41.

162. Id. at 28.
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businesses on its third channel.16 Graphic customers should be
able to call by telephone and receive teletext information on their
home computers.1 6 4 DBSC also plans to offer teletext and data services. 65 Finally, the application of STC reveals plans to offer
teletext services in the fully operational system. 6"
The FCC advisory group presented three studies on the market for teletext communications. A study by International Resource Development reports that DBS could provide service
amounting to $9 billion by 1990.167 Strategic, Inc. sees a $1 billion
market in 1985 increasing to $5 billion by the end of the decade." 8
The Institute for the Future report predicts a $3.7 billion market
for DBS by 1990.1' In its application Graphic Scanning expects
teletext demand to increase from 1000 to 110,000 subscribers between 1986 and 1990.170 Again, the studies exhibit glaring deficiencies. While the studies do not expect DBS to provide all teletext
transmissions,17 ' not a single study even explains why DBS should
capture any of the market. The advisory group called the studies
at best informed guesses. 7 The teletext demand, in these studies,
appears to rely on a strong home computer market that currently
exceeds present teletext capacity.
(3) Other Technological Services
DBS applicants propose a number of new services for consumers. STC, DBSC, USSB, Graphic, and Western Union will provide
subchannels that allow broadcasts in second languages.17 These
applicants as well as CBS and RCA also will offer stereophonic
sound when the systems become fully operational.17 4 Finally,
163.
164.

92 F.C.C.2d at 71.
Id. at 74; see also Good News, Bad News in DBS Spacerush, supra note 126, at

26.
165.
166.

Good News, Bad News in DBS Spacerush, supra note 126, at 26.
91 F.C.C.2d at 958.
167. WORKING GROUP 1-B SuBcomm. 1 (SERVICE REQunRmlENTs) oF FCC ADVISORY
COMM. ON DIREcT BROADCASTING SATELLITES, FINAL REPORT 9 (Gen. Docket No. 80-398 voL 4
(1982)) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
168. Id.
169. Id. at 10.
170. Good News, Bad News in DBS Spacerush, supra note 126, at 26.
171. Both the International Resource Development and the Institute for the Future
studies give DBS only 10% of the teletext market. FINAL REPORT, supra note 167, at 9, 10.
172. Id. at 14.
173. 92 F.C.C.2d at 72, 74, 77, 79; 91 F.C.C.2d at 958.
174. 92 F.C.C.2d at 70-79; 91 F.C.C.2d at 958.
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DBSC intends to offer an alarm system through its subchannels. 1 6
(e) Initial Cost of DBS
Of the DBS applicants, only CBS failed to present an estimate
of the cost for its system. 178 The cost estimates range from $136
million to $969.7 million for the initial phase. 17 The applicants
will invest more than $3.1 billion. The potential DBS operators, of
course, premise this investment on the beliefs that video viewers
have not reached their saturation point, that consumers will
purchase equipment to receive the satellite transmission, and that
DBS services will provide a competitive product. One commissioner already has expressed an opinion that at least one company
may "lose its shirt. 17' 8 The FCC, however, plans to let market
forces determine the viability of DBS. To the eight parties granted
applications, DBS represents a multimillion dollar gamble-a gamble that could open billion dollar markets and revolutionize television viewing.
7. DBS: Technology in Search of a Market
The Commission's treatment of DBS has been characterized
as nothing short of historic: 17 9 the introduction of a new radio service largely free from the constraints of federal regulation. Despite
its relative freedom from obtrusive regulation, DBS service still
must overcome the competitive problems that the video marketplace presents. This portion of the Article attempts to assess the
approved proposals in terms of the experience of other innovative
video services. The Commission deemed itself an inappropriate forum for addressing the economic viability of DBS service, and
clearly the Commission cannot warrant that a service it authorizes
175. Good News, Bad News in DBS Spacerush, supra note 126, at 26.
176. The FCC granted the CBS application on the condition that CBS provide this
information by February 3, 1982. 92 F.C.C.2d at 109-10.
177. The following table summarizes the cost estimates: (in millions of dollars)

Graphic

136

Western Union

161.7 (initial cost)

Videosat
RCA
DBSC

232.1 (Phase I cost)
374
577

STC
USSB

683.6
969

92 F.C.C.2d at 105-08; 91 F.C.C.2d at 957.
178. 91 F.C.C.2d 953, 1000 (Jones, Comm'r., dissenting).
179. Fagan, supra note 150, at 382-83.
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will be a commercial success. Nonetheless, a serious inquiry into

the nature of the video product and the number of video consumers likely to need or want DBS service has relevance beyond the
issue of economic viability. Such an inquiry goes to the core of the
Commission's responsibility for determining that a proposed allocation of scarce spectrum space will serve the public interest.
The protracted proceedings before the Commission have not
resulted in a diminution of the uncertainty surrounding DBS service. The questions of whether consumer interest will justify the
enormous start-up costs and whether DBS programming will prove
distinctive from programming available in abundance via existing
transmission modes remain unanswered. While potential for successful DBS service arguably exists,18 0 a distinction, nevertheless,
must be made between the broad potential audience for DBS service and the number of consumers who choose DBS over the other
available options. Furthermore, the protracted time frame during
which the proposed DBS systems will become operational is significant; an even greater variety of video delivery modes than now
exists will characterize the communications industry by the time
DBS systems are fully ready to compete. 181 The leading option to
conventional television probably will continue to be cable, which
experts expect to reach fifty percent of all American television
households by 1990.182 Cable, however, has been demonstrably slow

in reaching the core cities of large urban areas. Consequently, a
significant opportunity exists for an assortment of over-the-air services. These services include subscription television (STV), multipoint distribution services (MDS), low-power televisions (LPTV),
and satellite master antenna televisions (SMATV). Although limited in the number of channels offered and the geographic areas
served, these services, nonetheless, enjoy one significant competitive advantage-an ability to step quickly and cheaply into the
180. The distinguishing feature of DBS technology is its capacity for aggregating a
national or regional audience. Recent market research has produced estimates, exceeding 15
million, of the number of homes that could have rooftop satellite dishes by 1990. Another
recent survey concluded that 54% of consumers would be interested in having a satellite
dish that would provide them with multichannel reception on a regular basis. The survey
also reported that among those consumers already receiving cable service, interest would be
as much as 52%. Bedell, Future of Cable TV is Being FashionedToday, N.Y. Times, Sept.
29, 1982, § 1, at Al, col. 2.
181. Holsendolph, Tougher Times Ahead for Cable TV, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1982, §

3, at 1, col. 2; telephone interview with Ernest Holsendolph (Feb. 3, 1983) (discussing the
future of cable TV).
182. National Cable Television Ass'n Submission to House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance (available through J. Walter Thompson).
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void left by cable. The steady growth that the industry expects
from these delivery systems through the end of this decade suggests that the number of consumers who experience a specific need
for DBS service will be somewhat lower than the number currently
expressing an "interest" in rooftop dishes.
Whether DBS service successfully attracts enough of an audience to become economically viable undoubtedly will depend more
upon programming than upon any other single consideration. Indeed, recent events in the subscription cable area illustrate the truism that "the program is the thing."18 Programming, and not
technology, is the means by which consumers distinguish the various alternative services from each other. DBS programming continues to be largely an unknown quantity. None of the approved
applicants for DBS have brought forth explicit plans indicating
that DBS programming will be better than or different from the
entertainment fare that other services are now providing.
In sum, finding an audience and developing a distinctive product are the key problems confronting direct satellite broadcasters
as they prepare to enter the competitive market. At the same time,
some of the issues concerning spectrum use and regulatory options
could resurface. Indeed, merely establishing a secure niche in the
video marketplace does not guarantee service in the public interest. The authorization of DBS service required the dedication of
valuable spectrum space, precluding the use of that space by both
its preexisting users and other potentially beneficial services. How
well the Commission has managed the 11.7-12.7 GHz band is open
to question if DBS service offers nothing more than familiar entertainment fare to an audience for whom it is already available in
abundance. In that case, DBS service will have achieved economic
success without realizing any of the benefits cited as justification
for authorizing the service.
III.
A.

REGULATION OF

DBS

IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM

The Vehicle for Technically Oriented DBS Regulations: The
ITU
1.

International Telecommunication Union

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the major international organization for the coordination and regulation
183. O'Connor, Another Blow to Quality Cable, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1983, § 2, at 25,
Col. 1.
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of international telecommunications. Established in 1932, the ITU
is the oldest of the telecommunications organizations and is now a
specialized agency of the United Nations. 184 The ITU is composed
of representatives from 157 member nations.18 5 The scope of ITU
activities is limited to technical issues,8 6 with the United Nations
Organization and other mulEducational, Scientific, and Cultural
1 87
tinational groups handling policy.

The ITU's main functions with respect to satellite broadcasting are to maintain international cooperation and rational use of
telecommunications, to harmonize actions of all countries planning
to use DBS, to allocate and to improve the use of the radio frequency spectrum, to make regulations governing DBS 188 and to allocate positions on the geostationary orbit. 89 The principal organs
of the ITU relevant to DBS regulation are the Plenipotentiary
Conference, the Administrative Conferences, and two of the four
permanent committees: the International Frequency Registration
Board (IFRB) 90 and the International Radio Consultative Com184.

UNITED NATIONS, EvERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS

532 (8th ed. 1968). The United

Nations recognized ITU as a specialized agency in 1947. The ITU has evolved into its present state over more than a century; its predecessor, the International Telegraph Union, was
established on May 17, 1865, at a Paris conference. The ITU resulted from a merger of that
body with the International Radiotelegraph Union in 1932. The ITU is headquartered in
Geneva, Switzerland. Rutkowski, The 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference: The
ITU in a Changing World, 13 INT'L LAW. 289, 290 (1979).
185. Codding, The ITU and the Plenipotentiary,INTERMEDIA, Jan. 1983, at XXIII.
Each member nation has one vote. International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25,
1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495, 2511, T.I.A.S. No. 8572 [hereinafter cited as I.T.C.].

186. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, RADIOFREQUENCY USE AND MANAGEMENT, IMPACTS FROM THE WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE OF 1979 46 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as O.T.A. STUDY]. The International Telecommunication Convention contains the
body of rules that governs the ITU. See I.T.C., supra note 185, 28 U.S.T. at 2497-2590.
187. O.T.A. STUDY, supra note 186, at 26-27. For example, UNESCO has studied questions concerning the New World Information Order. Id. at 54. The International Telegraph
Convention and the International Radiotelegraph Convention combined to form the International Telecommunication Convention. G. CODDING & A. RUTKOWSI, THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD 18 (1982). The 1973 modification resulted in the Convention that currently governs. See I.T.C., supra note 185, 28 U.S.T. at
2497.
188. See I.T.C., supra note 185, 28 U.S.T. at 2512, art. 4. Although no enforcement
mechanism exists to ensure a member's performance, membership in the Union entails a
treaty obligation to conform to collective decisions of the members. O.T.A. STUDY, supra
note 186, at 46.
189. Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. AICONF.101/10, at 96 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Report of UNCEPUOS].
190. The Atlantic City Telecommunication Conference created the IFRB in 1947. G.
CODDING & A. RUTKOWSKI, supra note 187, at 117.

100
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mittee (CCIR). 191
The IFRB is a five-member elected board responsible for registering the basic technical characteristics of each space network
station in accordance with ITU regulations, including the positions
that countries assign to geostationary satellites 92 and the frequencies that countries use on the radio spectrum. The registration of
spectrum allocations puts other nations on notice of the assignment and protects the registered country from harmful interference by other users of the same band.9 s The Board's primary notification task is to record in the Master Frequency Register the
frequencies assigned to member administrations. 9 4 Coordination
ensures that after a space system goes into operation it will not
receive interference from, or cause interference to, other space or
terrestrial systems sharing frequencies. 9 "
As one of the two technical study groups of the ITU, the CCIR
conducts studies and makes recommendations on technological developments. 196 Experts from member countries, scientific and industrial organizations, and even some private companies may participate in CCIR studies. 97 Members respect the CCIR as a source
of information and guidance on the use of new technologies; consequently, they generally accept CCIR recommendations. 9 "
The Plenipotentiary Conference is the highest branch in the
ITU structure. The Conference meets every five to eight years to
consider administrative and organizational matters.' The Confer191. O.T.A. STUDY, supra note 186, at 49. The third and fourth permanent organs are
the General Secretariat, which makes arrangements for the conferences and, therefore, indirectly controls DBS, and the CCITT, which studies and makes recommendations regarding
technical developments, operations, and tariffs for telephone and telegraphy. Id.

192. Report of UNCEPUOS, supra note 189, at 97. The IFRB produces technical and
operational standards for allocation. "Allocation" is defined as entry into the Table of Frequency Allocations of a given frequency band for use by one or more terrestrial or space
radiocommunication services. G. CODDING & A. RuTKowsKu, supra note 187, at 250.
193. Jasentuliyana, Regulations Governing Space Telecommunication, in 1 MANUAL
ON SPACE LAW 208 (N. Jasentuliyana & A. Lee eds. 1979). Allocation of a position on the
geostationary orbit and assignments on the radio frequency band, however, are not
equivalent to sovereignty over the space. O.T.A. STUDY, supra note 186, at 51.
194. G. CODDING & A. RUTKowsIU, supra note 187, at 123. The WARC-79 significantly
altered the IFRB's Table of Frequency Allocations by adding satellite radiocommunication
services to the Table. Id. at 259.
195. Id. at 206. Article 10 of the Convention delineates the IFRB's functions.
196. Report of UNCEPUOS, supra note 189, at 97.
197. O.T.A. STUDY, supra note 186, at 49.
198. Id.
199. D. LEIvE, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION 3
(1972). The Administrative Council meets annually to handle administrative ITU functions
between the Plenipotentiary Conferences. Id.
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ence is the only arm of the ITU that may modify the Convention 20 0
to keep pace with developing technologies and world policies.
2.

ITU Conferences

The ITU carries out its duties through world and regional conferences.20 1 These conferences include the World Administrative
Radio Conferences (WARCs), which meet infrequently to discuss
specific topics, 20 2 the Regional Administrative Radio Conferences
(RARCs), which convene to discuss communications problems of a
regional scope, 20 - and the Plenipotentiary Conferences. Several
ITU conferences in recent years have been significant to the development of DBS:20 4 the 1971 Space WARC, the 1977 Broadcast Satellite WARC, the 1979 WARC, the 1982 Plenipotentiary, and the
1983 RARC. These conferences are discussed below.
The 1971 WARC for Space Telecommunications (WARC-71)
convened to discuss the developments and use of geostationary
satellites in communications.2 0 5 Participants at the WARC-71
modified the ITU technical standards contained in the Table of
Frequency Allocations, and arranged the use of orbital positions
and frequency channels.20 6 The WARC-71 adopted a resolution directing a later conference, the WARC which eventually met in
1977, to draft technical criteria, principles, and plans for DBS. °7
The 1977 WARC for Broadcasting Satellites (WARC-BS-77)
affected significantly DBS development. 20 8 Representatives at the
WARC-BS-77 equitably assigned the space service frequencies and
orbital positions on an a priori basis among all ITU members, a
reversal of the previous a postiori method.20 9 WARC-BS-77 called
200.

O.T.A.

201. G.

STUDY, supra note

CODDING &

A.

186, at 47.

RUTKOWSKI, supra note 187, at 59.

202. Id. at 70. Recent WARC's include the WARC-BS-77, the WARC-79, and the
WARC-71. See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
203. See I.T.C., supra note 185, 28 U.S.T., at 2515, art. 7.
204. Jasentuliyana,supra note 193, at 198-208.

205. G.

CODDMING

& A.

RUTKOWSKI,

supra note 187, at 46.

206. Id.
207. Id. at 49.
208. The WARC-BS-77 convened from January 10 to February 13, 1977. Butler,
World Administrative Radio Conference for Planning BroadcastingSatellite Service, 5 J.
SPACE

L. 93, 94 (1977).

209. Rothblatt, ITU Regulation of Satellite Communication, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 10
(1982). A priori assignment is a method whereby slots are assigned in anticipation of future
needs. This contrasts the previous ITU policy of a posteriori assignment, under which slots
are assigned when a country is technologically capable of using them, the so-called "firstcome-first-served" approach. Rutkowski, supra note 184, at 306-09.
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for a subsequent conference to undertake more detailed planning
for broadcast satellites.21 0 This resulted in the RARC-83.
Although the 1979 WARC (WARC-79) did not discuss DBS
issues specifically, some of its results were pertinent to DBS.
WARC-79 decided to divide the 12 GHz band between broadcast
satellite and fixed satellite services, and to guarantee equitable access for all members to orbital positions and frequencies.2 1 '
WARC-79 adopted an allocation plan of 11.7-12.2 GHz for fixed
satellite service (FSS), with direct broadcast satellites permitted to
operate in this band with restrictions, and of 12.3-12.7 GHz primarily for direct broadcast satellites, with FSS permitted to operate
in this band under certain conditions. The Conference devised the
12.1-12.3 band to accommodate both direct broadcast satellites
and FSS until the 1983 RARC could establish permanent rules.212
The 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference 213 less significantly affected direct regulation of DBS.21 4 The Conference called for an
increased role for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) in the future of telecommunications.2 1 5 The CCITT now has jurisdiction over all telecommunications services other than radio communication.216
The
Plenipotentiary Conference agreed to hold several future meetings
to discuss DBS issues: a recently held 1983 RARC, a 1985 WARC,
and a 1988 WARC.21 Additionally, the Plenipotentiary Conference
called for a World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Con-

ference to establish a broad regulatory scheme for all existing and
210. Butler, supra note 208, at 95.
211. Rothblatt, supra note 209, at 12.
212. Id. at 13.
213. Plenipotentiaries meet every five to nine years. In the interim, the Administrative
Council meets to oversee policy and ITU functions. O.T.A. STUDY, supra note 186, at 47.
Each member of the ITU has a right to send one or more representatives to the Plenipotentiary Conferences, G. CODDING & A. RUTOWSI, supra note 187, at 60-61, and numerous
observers are usually present to watch the proceedings. The ITU does not release details of
the entire conference to the general public, so most administrations find it advantageous to
send a delegation. Id.
214. The General Secretariat performs much of the preparatory work for the Plenipotentiary Conferences. The Secretariat gathers proposals that member countries submit, produces minutes of the meetings, and publishes final reports of the conferences. G. COMnING &
A. RUTKOWSKI, supra note 187, at 63.
215. Rutkowski, Report on the ITU Plenipotentiary,CHRON. OF INT'L COu., Nov.-Dec.
1982, at 1, 7. For a description of the CCITT, see supra note 191.
216. Rutkowski, supra note 215, at 7. In spite of the enormous political and technological changes that have taken place in telecommunications, much of the current regulatory
framework has existed since 1865.
217. G. CODDING & A. RUTKOWSKI, supra note 187, at 7.
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foreseen telecommunications services. 218
The most significant conference for DBS matters has been the
1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference (RARC-83) for
Region 2,219 which met for five weeks in Geneva during June and
July. The United States sought and obtained eight satellite orbital
positions, with a maximum of 500 MHz of spectrum space, and up
to thirty-two channels of service each. 220 The United States also
achieved one of its major goals-establishment of the lower end of
the DBS band at 12.2 GHz. This ruling ensures a full 500 MHz for
2
FSS. 21
The United States, however, failed at RARC-83 in other significant matters. The nation, for example, failed to obtain approval
of its positioning plan at RARC-83. The United States proposal
would have permitted the satellites to serve adequately the entire
continental United States.22 The plan accepted by RARC breaks
up the United States orbital positioning arc to accommodate Canadian and Mexican satellites. As a result, Western satellites cannot
serve the United States Mountain time zone. 2 3 This plan also
gives low elevation angles for satellites that will serve the Eastern
United States, causing inadequate eclipse protection during the
spring and fall equinoxes. 2 4
The failure of the United States proposal for a highpower
standard was an even more serious setback. The United States had
proposed a standard power flux density (pfd) of minus 105 db to
the square meter. The standard that the RARC approved was a
pfd of minus 107 db, which translates into a sixty percent difference in power.2 25 Although the approved standard is sufficient for
218. Id.
219. Region 2 consists of the Americas and Greenland. Jasentuliyana, supra note 193,
at 229.
220. Coming to Consensus in Geneva, BROADCASTING, July 18, 1983, at 24.
221. Thus, FSS would encompass the 11.7-12.2 GHz spectrum range and DBS would
cover the 12.2-12.7 GHz spectrum band. Id.
222. Id. The proposal called for eight satellites in an arc beginning at 170 degrees west
and continuing east at intervals of approximately 10 degrees. Id.
223. Id. The allotted positions of United States satellites are 175 degrees west, 166
degrees, 157 degrees, 148 degrees, 119 degrees, 110 degrees, 101 degrees, and 61.5 degrees.
U.S. Team Back from Geneva, Pleased with Itself and ITU, BROADCASTING, July 25, 1983,
at 26.
224. Coming to Consensus in Geneva, supra note 220, at 24. When the earth crossed
between the sun and the satellite in the 61.5 degree west slot, the sun's rays would not reach
the satellite's solar-powered batteries. Therefore, the satellite could go dark as early as 9:23
p.m. and remain dark for up to 72 minutes. Id.
225. U.S. Team Back from Geneva, Pleased with Itself and ITU, supra note 223, at
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current technology, the United States had hoped for a higher standard to allow for growth.22 Consequently, the United States already has disclosed that it will not abide by the RARC's decision,
but will proceed instead with development of the higher standard
technology. These actions could weaken the ITU agreement. 2 7
B.

The International Views on BroaderPolicy Issues
1. Europe and Canada

Although the European nations generally have sided with the
United States in United Nations debates on international broadcasting issues, 2 the United States and its European allies do not
share a common view on the role of government in regulating
broadcasting. The premium that the United States places upon the
free flow of information over government prior restraint and content regulation 229 puts it at the radical edge of the international

DBS debate. Canada, the United Kingdom, and most other European nations-countries that share a common cultural heritage
with the United States-see pervasive government regulation as
necessary for the protection of their citizens from potential commercial abuses and for the provision of educational and informational services throughout their respective nations. DBS provides
these countries with the capability of fulfilling these goals by enabling them to reach isolated rural populations with local programming for the first time. 23 0 Thus, the democratic and industrialized

nations of Europe and North America do not speak with one voice
226. Id. The United States contends that the higher standard would permit use of a
.75 meter antenna at less than one-third the cost of the one meter antenna required for the
lower standard. Id.
227. The United States signed the RARC Agreement, which became effective on January 1, 1984. Procedurally, the RARC Agreement constitutes a recommendation to the 1985
World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary Orbit and the
Planning of Space Services Utilizing It. The 1985 Conference will include formally the
RARC Agreement in the ITU Radio Regulations.
228.

See supra note 3.

229. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Pacifica discloses that content regulation in the United States has a narrow scope, limited for all practical purposes to
the elimination of "offensive language" accessible to minors. This prohibition includes sexual references, but does not include racial slurs, violence, or other socially unacceptable conversation. Julian Bond's claim that the FCC should prohibit radio stations in the South
from using words such as "nigger" in broadcasting provides an interesting opposing view.
See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1258-59 author's note (10th
ed. 1980).
230. HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, DIRECT BROADCASTING By SATELLITE: REPORT
OF A HomE OFFICE STUDY 29, 58 (1981) (British report).
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in the DBS debate.
In essence, the United States and its Canadian and European
allies seem to be following reverse patterns for development in this
capital-intensive new industry. For example, when the United
States Congress launched COMSAT in the early 1960's, the
lawmakers clearly intended to reduce the government's involvement in the fledgling industry and the degree of content regulation
as the industry developed.2 3' As the new communications technol-

ogy developed in the industrialized nations of Europe and Canada,
the legislatures seemed to favor the constant supervision of government to attain a balanced distribution of broadcast and telecommunications services. This subsection of the Article discusses the
emerging DBS policy of the democratic and industrial Western nations other than the United States. This subsection also explores
how the growing discord between the United States and its allies
could prevent the developed nations from assuming a united position in the international debate.
(a) The European Space Agency
The European nations created the European Space Agency
(ESA) in 1975 for the purpose of promoting the peaceful cooperation among the member nations in space research and technology.2 3' Initially, the ESA did not pursue aggressively the develop-

ment of DBS because-in the view of some observers-the agency
wanted to protect investments in cable systems.2 3' Recently, how-

ever, the ESA has escalated its efforts to provide DBS services to
smaller nations such as Luxembourg and Switzerland. 34 In the
case of the larger nations-France, Germany, and the United
231. See Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419; H.R.
11040, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 489. Debates
within Congress and from outside pressure groups are discussed at length in M. KINSLEY,
OUTER SPACE AND INNER SANCTUMS: GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATION

1-27 (1976).
232. ESA BULLETIN, Feb. 1982, at 1. The ESA Bulletin is the official publication of the
European Space Agency.
The ESA grew out of two earlier organizations: the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) and the European Organization for the Development and Construction of
Space Vehicle Launchers (ELDO). Its members states are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, with Austria and Norway as associate members and Canada as an observer.
233. RTL's Satellite Plans Put Off, Multichannel News, Dec. 27, 1982, at 33, col. 1;
Secunda, Satellite TV Breaks Down Barriers Over European Border, VARIETY, Oct. 26,
1982, at 28, 29.
234. See J. PELTON, GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS AND SATELLITE POLICY 57 (1974).
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Kingdom-ESA is promoting resource pooling to enable those
countries to utilize the DBS broadcasting slots that the WARC allocated to them in 1979.
Luxembourg's program most closely resembles the United
States system because it allows for and encourages commercial
programming.23 5 DBS observers anticipate that with strong terrestrial equipment, Luxembourg's programs will cover the European
"Golden Triangle," which includes France, Germany, and parts of
the British Isles. Recalling the case of the "Luxembourg effect" 2 6
in radio, many nations-particularly the United Kingdom, Holland, and Belgium-have tried to increase ESA-member nations'
responsibility for "overspill" under international law. Therefore,
the ESA probably will forge its accords to protect national culture
and to resolve environmental problems resulting from the overreach of powerful signals.
In addition, ESA may consider creating prior consent regulations to provide economic protection against unlicensed foreign
competition to member nations. According to some observers, the
potential receiving nations in Europe withheld their legislative initiatives in DBS regulation until after the ITU negotiations were
finalized in June 1983.37 ESA members now plan to institute consent regulations over DBS broadcasts.
(b) Switzerland
A report issued by Switzerland's Poste Telephone et
Telegraphique (PTT) described the Swiss government's plans to
launch a DBS satellite using the ESA's Arianne launcher to ensure
the viability of all communications within and among the cantons
of the Swiss federation. 2 8 Reaffirming that the frequency spectrum
and orbits of geostationary satellites are limited natural resources,
the PTT stated that the geostationary slots should be treated with
235. Luxembourg will provide this DBS programming by 1986. See Luxembourg Plans
Satellite TV Service, Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 1983, at C14, col. 2.
236. The "Luxembourg effect" is defined as follows: "Cross-modulation between two
radio signals [passing] through the ionosphere, due to the non-linearity of the propagation
characteristics of free charges in space. Because of this effect, the program of a powerful
station is sometimes heard when a receiver is tuned to a weaker station on a different frequency." J. MARKUS, ELECTRONICS AND NUCLEONICS DICTIONARY 374 (3d ed. 1966).
237. Telephone interview with Mary Pitella, Public Affairs Officer of STC (Jan. 21,
1983).
238. As in most of Europe, national governmental agencies are created by statute to
serve the public and to ensure that the nation has continuous communication, postal, telephone, and telegraph services.
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parsimony in the interest of all nations..2 9 The report also restated
the Swiss intention to adhere to the Geneva ITU accords and to
refrain from broadcasting into other nations without their prior
consent. This reference to the existing international regimes implies that the Swiss government expects to incorporate the acknowledged principles of international law into domestic broadcasting legislation. The report, however, recommends that
government should not shape actively the content of the Swiss
DBS system. 24 0 The PTT stated that total control of DBS is
neither the right of any private group or person nor the sole right
of the government. Instead, the governmental agency proposed a
"mixed" system, which would allow up to one-third of the funding
for the DBS industry to come from private sources. 24 1 Although
the PTT would retain exclusive rights for the transmission of
radioelectric signals and sounds, the proposed system presumably
would serve the national interest by providing greater program selection to the isolated areas of rural cantons.
(c) Canada
The new Canadian Constitution,2 42 adopted in 1981, at first
glance supports an expansive freedom of the press and electronic
media. According to section 2(b) of the Constitution, "freedom of
thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the
press and other media of communication" are "fundamental freedoms. ' ' 24 3 This prominent effort to protect the emerging telecommunications media, however, actually reflects the Canadian government's aggressive view of the national government's proper role
in fostering and regulating program content. The notion that only
the government adequately can protect its people from dangerous
abuses of liberty permeates the Canadian Constitution.4 Unsurprisingly, the Canadian government carefully monitors the content
239. The PTT's report acknowledged the possibility of overlap between Switzerland
and its neighbors, France and Germany.-Switzerland expects to launch its DBS in 1985-86,
using a minimum of three to five channels. Swiss FEDERAL POSTAL AND TELEPHONE SERVICE,
RADIO DIFFUSION PAR SATELLITE (1981).
" 240. Id. Switzerland is a federation of independent cantons. The PTT proposed to
provide independent programming to the communities in the rural cantons that cannot afford terrestrial equipment. Id.
241. Id.
242. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, enacted by Canada Act, 1982, U.K. 1982, c. 11.
243. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, § 2(b). The new Canadian Constitution replaces the
British North America Act of 1867 as the Canadian Charter of the Rights and Freedoms.
244. See, e.g., Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I.
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of programming in television broadcasts to limit the presentation
of socially undesirable programming and to ensure the development of the medium's educational and public interest potential.
The Canadian government takes the position that state support of, and government involvement in, the communications industry is consistent with its constitutional authority to promote
national unity throughout its large and diverse country. No group
other than the Canadian government has the funds or the incentive to sponsor programming that will reach provinces in the
Northwest Territory. Also consistent with this concern for national
unity is the governmental effort to ensure that Canadian corporations are the primary contractors for the Canadian DBS
industry.245
Finally, the Canadian government feels a strong commitment
to protect its culture from contamination by foreign broadcasts.
The government imposes a statutory limitation upon the percentage of foreign programs and advertisements that may appear on a
station within a specified period of time. Of all of the developed
DBS producing nations, Canada remains the country that the
United States' aggressive commercial policies most threaten. If
past experience provides valid precedent for future broadcasting
controversies, Canadian DBS faces the prospect of direct competition with American DBS programming. This competition will have
the two-fold effect of subjecting Canadian viewers to "inferior"
programming and of threatening the economic viability of the Canadian DBS industry. For these reasons, the Canadian government
recently has begun a program designed to eliminate overspill
broadcasting from the United States into Canadian territory.4 s
245.

With respect to service for distant provinces, prior to the development of the

Anik C satellite and the DBS industry, these regions could not be served because of the
economic infeasiblity of terrestrial broadcasting over a large area with a sparse population.
CANADIAN DEP'T OF COMMUNICATIONS, CANADIAN SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 2, 5 (1967).

With respect to the utilization of Canadian contractors, this is consistent with § 3 of the
Parliament's Broadcasting Act of 1968. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 25, § 3 (1968). The Act has its
historical roots in the Aird Commission's 1929 report, which put forward the now accepted

idea that airwaves are public property and, therefore, should be subject to government regulation. CANADIAN DEP'T OF COMMUNICATIONS, DIRECT-To-HoME SATELLITE BROADCASTING FOR
CANADA 6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as CANADIAN DEP'T OF COMMUNICATIONS, DIREcT-TO-HomE

SATELLrrE BROADCASTING]. Although the Act did not contemplate broadcasting from satellites, it remains "the principal policy statement guiding the actions of the CBC, the CRTC,
[the] government, and the broadcasting industry in general." Id. Section 3 of the Act provides that systems be "owned and controlled by Canadians so as to safeguard, enrich and
strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada.
"Broadcasting
Act of 1968, § 3.
246. See Canadian Dep't of Communications, Fox Takes Steps to Reinforce Canadian
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Obviously, fruitful negotiation with the United States would facilitate the implementation of the Canadian plan. To that end, Canada has undertaken certain efforts to strengthen its diplomatic
relations with our nation's communications authorities. The Canadian government in the late 1960's created a communications satellite system to operate in conjunction with radio and terrestrial systems.24 7 The Canadian government expects communications
satellites to start low frequency DBS transmissions for United
States based corporations as well as for the Canadian population
within the next two years. 48
The Canadian view that government should regulate directly
the content of DBS programming openly conflicts with the position
of its neighbor, the United States. 249 The Canadians are wary of
the United States' aggressive exploitation of the new industry and
fear that Canadian entrepreneurs will be lost in the technology
scramble. Therefore, a substantial likelihood exists that Canada
will promulgate DBS content regulations to protect its economic
interests as well as its national and cultural values.
(d) The United Kingdom
The concept of "free press" that prevails in the United Kingdom is a precursor to the principles that appear in the United
States Constitution. The British perception, however, is dramatiBroadcasting System (Oct. 7, 1982) (news release). The release states that "[i]n the very
near future, we expect to enhance significantly viewers' diversity of choice in a new broadBut,
casting environment which will include more and better Canadian programming ....
in the meantime, we must protect licensed Canadian broadcast undertakings because these
are the foundations upon which we must build." Id. According to the release, both the Radio Act and the Broadcasting Act contain provisions for enforcement. See also CANADIAN

Dm'T OF COMMUNICATIONS,

DIRECT-To-Homss SATELLITE BROADCASTING,

supra note 245, at 83

(concerning the problems that overspill from the United States causes to Canada).
Canada's Broadcasting Act of 1968 presents "a standard for gauging the performance of
the Canadian broadcasting system." Id. at 30. According to that standard, "all broadcasters

are required to provide programming of high standard, using predominantly Canadian creative and other sources." Id. That most American programming under this standard is "inferior" is hardly surprising.
247.

CANADIAN DEP'T OF COMMUNICATIONS,

248.

Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Act,

CANADIAN SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

6.

CAN. REv. STAT. ch.

T-

4, §§ 70-93 (1974) (provided for telephone communications via satellite) (revised 1975 &

1976). The government also has established the Broadcasting Strategy of March 1, 1983, to
develop Canadian broadcasting by funding up to "one-third of the costs of Canadian drama,
variety and children's programming produced by private Canadian program producers for
exhibition. . . in Canada." CANADIAN DEr'T OF COMMUNICATIONS, DIRECT-To-HoME SATELLITE BROADCASTING, supra note 245, at 32.
249.

See supra part II, section B.
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cally different in its insistence that the press and broadcasting media be socially responsible. An assumed link between government
control and social responsibility led to the creation of the government run British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) fifty years
ago. 250 In concept, the British approach resembles the systems of
Canada, Switzerland, and other European nations. The United
Kingdom attempts to blend governmental involvement in providing the public services of entertainment and information with the
promotion of general social welfare. These goals might not be so
readily attainable, in the United Kingdom's view, if the government left telecommunications entirely to private industry. The
quality controls upon programming are particularly well-known in
the case of the BBC, whose programs are popular in the United
States and other English speaking nations.
Public funds that Parliament allocates finance the BBC's services. The source of these public funds is a license fee imposed
upon BBC viewers. That audiences paid a "license" fee to receive
broadcast signals from the time of its inception led commentators
to consider BBC radio, and later, television, as the "rich man's
toy. 2 51 The rationale for this Parliament controlled system remains that Parliament can judge best the value and quality of
BBC programming because Parliament is ultimately responsible to
the electorate. In this sense, the BBC's model is particularly instructive for DBS regulation because of the link between sponsorship of the medium and audience response. As an illustration, the
viewing public and government authorities greeted the move towards advertising on television in the United Kingdom with some
trepidation. This uneasiness explains the government's eventual
52
regulation of the duration and content of television commercials.
The government anticipates that the existing regulatory system for
television and other forms of broadcasting sufficiently will accommodate new technology broadcasting.25 Thus, all of the present
250. According to the Home Secretary in charge of broadcasting for the United Kingdom,"the primary function of the corporation is to provide public services, television and

radio services."

HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE,

supra note 230, at 33. This report also

discusses the costs, accessibility, and regulatory framework for DBS, including copyright
and environmental concerns.
251. See LORD WINDLESHAm, BROADCASTING IN A FREE SOCIETY 20-21 (1980). The
book's final chapter is devoted to future trends in DBS broadcasting. Lord Windlesham is
reluctant to accept the position that the United Kingdom's content regulation effectively
can meet the needs of the inherently different nature of DBS industry.

252. See
253.

HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE,

Id. at 64.

supra note 230, at 58.
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content regulations in the United Kingdom probably will apply to
DBS.
2.

The Developing Countries

The United Nations has been the predominant forum for developing nations to express their views on the appropriate legal
constraints for DBS. Although the developing nations are not at
the forefront of DBS development, they have used the United Nations forum to make their concerns known to the nations developing the technology. 25' The immediate problems that developing
countries confront are the spillover effects of satellite broadcasts as
other nations' DBS systems become operational. Over the past two
decades of United Nations debates, the developing countries have
become increasingly unified in articulating their fears. Because
their overriding concern has been that the content of Western programs would contaminate their cultures and disrupt their political
independence, the central issue has become one of national sovereignty versus the free flow of information. 255 The United Nations
forum that has been most responsive to these worries is the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO). In UNESCO the developing nations outnumber the
developed countries, especially when the Soviet bloc joins the developing nations in the voting. Thus, the developing countries have
an influential role at the United Nations in the development of
principles governing the use of DBS.
In 1946 both the United Nations and UNESCO considered the
principle of the free flow of information to be the international
254. Most developing nations will not confront the issue of regulating the content of a
national DBS system through national laws for another decade or so. Some nations, however, such as Saudi Arabia, Romania, China, and Indonesia, probably will launch national
DBS spacecraft within the next decade. Communications Daily, Sept. 7, 1982, at 3-4. These
nations very likely will raise the question of whether national laws should regulate content
much sooner. Nonetheless, the majority of developing nations probably will participate in
joint or multinational DBS satellite ventures because they do not have the resources to
launch their own national spacecraft. For these nations, principles articulated in bilateral,

regional, and international legal regimes will control content regulation.
255. Many writers have discussed the problem that DBS poses to developing countries
striving to maintain their cultural and national integrity. A recent House Report recognized
both national sovereignty and fear of cultural erosion as being among the social, political,
and cultural barriers to the free flow of information. HousE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW: FORGING A NEW FRAMEWORK, H.R. REP. No. 1535, 96th

Cong., 2d Sess. 19-23 (1980). For more detail on these issues, see T. McPHAIL, ELECTRONIC
COLONIALISM: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING COMMUNICATION (1981) and K.
NORDENSTRENG & H. SCHILLER, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

(1979).
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ideal.2 56 Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights asserted that persons have the right "to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers. 2 57 The General Conference of UNESCO adopted a similar principle recommending that member states "recognize the
right of citizens to listen freely to broadcasts from other
countries."2 58
In the 1960's, however, the Soviet bloc and developing countries increasingly called for more restrictions on DBS broadcasts.
These nations interpreted the potential of DBS broadcasts to be
quantitatively and qualitatively different from other forms of communication.2 5 9 For instance, a DBS transmission can cover about
1,000,000 square miles while broadcasts relayed from satellites to
terrestrial stations and then to individual receivers can cover a
maximum of about 10,000 square miles. Moreover, as the technology needed for ground receivers of DBS broadcasts has become
simpler, the sophistication of technology for jamming celestial
broadcasts, as opposed to terrestrial broadcasts, has grown more
expensive and difficult to use effectively. 60 In sum, these nations
foresaw that for nations to control the reception of foreign DBS
satellites would be very difficult; 61 thus, "[p]sychologically, DBS
256. The preeminence of the principle of the free flow of information regardless of
borders has undergone considerable erosion as the competing principles regarding the rights
of national sovereignty, including the right to nonintervention in domestic affairs and the
right to preserve one's cultural integrity, have become predominant in the developing countries and the Soviet bloc countries. See infra notes 259-301 and accompanying text.
257. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (I1) A, U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 75 (1948).
258. Records of the General Conference, UNESCO 3d Sess., vol. II, U.N. Doc. 3 C/110,
Res. 7.2221 (1948). For a discussion of other relevant UNESCO documents, see infra notes
309-49 and accompanying text.
259. For a discussion of the developing countries' early expressions of concern regarding the use of space communications, see infra text accompanying notes 316-22.
260. C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 606 (1982).
261. The "technology inversion" aspect of DBS is not an entirely negative prospect for
the developing countries. Although the possible inability to control the receipt of foreign
DBS is of great concern to the developing countries, that the DBS ground receivers are less
expensive than other communications systems means that these nations can skip the stage
of building costly terrestrial communications systems. The following quotation better illustrates the important role that DBS communications systems may play in helping developing
countries "leap-frog" stages of economic development.
Space technology can be a powerful tool to accelerate national development- it provides
a way of leap-frogging over obsolete technologies and getting away from percolation
and trickle-down models of development for which the developing countries do not
have time. It could deal effectively with the problems of illiteracy, isolation and lack of
information afflicting the development process.
Report of UNCEPUOS, supra note 189, at 4-5.
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came to represent to many [nations] the epitome of a foreign cultural invasion tool which could invade countries and broadcast
26 2
propaganda without domestic or native content or control.
Based partially upon its domestic constitutional protection of
free speech, and partially upon its readiness to exploit commerically its advanced technology, the United States criticized this concern as an excuse for government control of the press and as a violation of the individual right to seek and receive information. 8 8
Most developing countries, however, only have become sovereign
nations following the post-World War II period of decolonization.
They presently are struggling to forge distinct national and cultural identities and, thus, react defensively to any perceived
threats to their -newly gained sovereignty. 26 4 Accordingly, the developing nations would like a legal regime for DBS to require at
least prior notification of broadcasts to the receiving state, and,
perhaps even, prior consent from the receiving state. This regime
would provide at least some control over content.
3.

The Soviet Bloc

The Soviet Union has advocated aggressively strict regulation
of information transmitted via direct broadcasting satellites. The
hallmark of the Soviet bloc position is the requirement of "prior
consent" before a foreign nation can transmit radio or television
broadcasts to the receiving nation. In advancing the "prior consent" requirement, the Soviet Union asserts that sovereign nations
share a fundamental right to be free from the type of external interference in their domestic affairs that occurs through direct
broadcasting by satellites. 26 5 In the debate surrounding the regula262.

T. McPHAIL, supra note 255, at 180.

263. The American delegate commenting on the passage of the 1982 United Nations'
DBS principles calling for prior consent stated that any requirement that broadcasters obtain the consent of such government "would violate our own obligations toward both the
broadcasters and the intended audience." See Pace, supra note 3, at A6, col. 3.
264.

See supra note 255.

265. Underlying the Soviet Union's position appears to be the fear that direct broadcasting from the West to Soviet home television sets soon will become possible and that
such broadcasting poses a serious political threat to the Soviet Union. Direct broadcasting
to Soviet homes by foreign nations would undercut the use of television as a Soviet state
instrument to advance Communist ideology. The importance of television as a state instrument for furthering political purposes is evident in the following Soviet statement made to
television workers on the eve of the October Revolution's Fiftieth Anniversary. "We must
see to it that every broadcast, going to millions of people, be infused with the acuteness of
Marxist-Leninist thought, that it enrich the minds and feelings of men and draw them into
active participation in the Communist construction." K. QuxsNxv, DIRECT BROADCAST
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tion of satellite communications, the Soviet Union has embarked
upon a campaign to establish prior consent as an element of a legal
regime governing DBS.
The Soviet bloc position has its genesis in the earliest United
Nations debates on DBS. On September 10, 1962, the Soviet Union
submitted its Draft Declaration of the Basic Principles Governing
the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space to the United Nations. 26 6 The Soviet Draft Declara-

tion stated that "the use of outer space for propagating war, national or racial hatred or enmity between nations shall be prohibited.

'267

Indeed, the Soviet Union was the only space-resource

state to make such an early reference to the subject of satellite
communications.26 8 In 1967 Czechoslovakia more clearly defined
the Soviet bloc position.2 69 The subject of space communications
became controversial at a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) meeting that year,270 when Czeckoslovakia
noted the need for direct satellite broadcasting to further international peace and to respect the sovereign equality of States.7 1
COPUOS, at the request of the General Assembly, had established a Working Group to consider the technical, economic, social,
and legal aspects of DBS by 1968. After the Working Group had
met for two of its five commissioned sessions, the Soviet Union
proposed to transfer the discussion of DBS back to the COPUOS
97, 103-04 (1978) (quoting R. Heffner, Open Skies vs.
Prior Censorship: The Soviet View of Direct Satellite Broadcasting (unpublished paper
presented at Schloss Leopoldskson, Salzburg (Oct. 30-Nov. 3, 1973))). The Soviet Union's
objection to the freedom of information principle that the United States and other Western
countries advocate is cast in the following terms by the Soviet delegation to the United
Nations:
Further, the representative of Belgium, spoke on the free flow of information. But a
question arises, whose flow? A clean flow, a creative flow in the interests of peace and
mankind? Or is it to be polluted by sex, violence, propaganda, misinformation, slander,
interference in international affairs, against the culture and civilization of every single
nation? This is what we are talking about.
SATELLITES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

B. SIGNITZER, REGULATION OF DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITES, THE U.N. INvOLvE-

MENT 47 (1976).

266. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.2 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Draft Declaration], reprinted in C. CHRISTOL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 480 (1966); see also C.
CHRISTOL, supra note 260, at 614-15.
267. Draft Declaration, supra note 266, quoted in C. CHRISTOL, supra note 260, at 61415.
268. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 260, at 614.
269. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.80, at 15 (1967).
270. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 260, at 616-17.
271. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.80, supra note 269, at 15.
272. 4 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note 193, at 179.
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Legal Sub-Committee. 27 The Soviet Union thus hoped to ensure
that a legally binding treaty would embody its view of strict DBS
regulation.7 4 The Soviet Union declared that DBS would be illegal
without the consent of the receiving state and, absent such consent, the state had the right to resist the illegal broadcasts.2 5
The Soviet bloc formally expressed these basic tenets in its
proposed Declaration of Model Principles presented to the third
session of the Working Group in May 1970.276 Principles 4, 6, and 7
were the three key principles of the 1970 Soviet Declaration. Principle 4 required the express consent of a receiving nation before2 a7
foreign nation could transmit radio or television broadcasts to it. "
Principle 6 provided that governments should bear the responsibility for any unauthorized broadcasts. 7 8 Principle 7 provided that
states had the right to counteract unauthorized broadcasts with
"any available means. ' 27 9
In 1972 the Soviet Union solidified the positions in the 1970
Declaration when it simultaneously introduced a resolution to the
General Assembly seeking a binding treaty on DBS regulations8 "
and proposed a highly restrictive convention on DBS to the Assembly.2 1 The draft convention, entitled Principles Governing the
Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct Television
Broadcasting, was even more specific in its DBS restrictions than
the 1970 Soviet Declaration.2 82 For example, article IV of the draft
273. K. QuE-NEY, supra note 265, at 95.
274. Id.
275. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/PV. 62, at 32-34 (1969).
276. Declaration of Model Principles, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/WG.3CRP. 1 (1970).
277. "Direct radio or television broadcasts by satellite to the population of a foreign
State may be carried out only with the express consent of the Government of that State."
Id. art. IV.
278. "[S]uch radio and television broadcasts to a foreign State may be carried out only
by organizations under the control of the Governments of the States involved." Id. art. VI.
279. Id. art. VII.
280. G.A. Res. 2916, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
281. Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct
Television Broadcasting (1972), U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Draft
Convention].
282. See id. The basic thrust of the Soviet Convention was that State sovereignty

must be protected from external interference. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in a
letter accompanying the Convention made this clear.
The introduction of direct television broadcasting by means of satellites will raise serious legal problems connected with the need to establish conditions under which this
new form of space technology will serve only the lofty goals of peace and friendship
between peoples. The first requirement is to protect the sovereignty of States from

any external interference.
Id. (emphasis added).
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convention would prohibit specific types of programs such as "any
material publicizing ideas of war, militarism, nazism, national and
racial hatred and enmity between people, as well as material which
is immoral or instigating in nature or is otherwise aimed at inter28
fering in the domestic affairs or foreign policy of other States.""
Article V of the draft convention reiterated the 1970 requirement
that direct broadcast take place only with the express consent of
the receiving nation. 4 Article VI deemed six types of broadcasts
illegal and subjected nations transmitting such broadcasts to liability. 285 Finally, article IX would permit any state to "employ the
means at its disposal to counteract illegal television broadcasting. '288 The Soviet Resolution essentially directed the COPUOS
Legal Sub-Committee to begin considering a binding treaty on direct television broadcasting.2 8 7 Several Western countries, however,
succeeded in amending the Soviet Resolution 2 8 so that it merely
called for an elaboration of principles "with a view to concluding
an international agreement or agreements. '2 9 The General Assembly overwhelmingly approved the amended Soviet Resolution on
November 9, 1972.290
In 1974 the Soviet Union presented a less restrictive version of
its 1972 draft convention."9 1 The Principles Governing the Use by
States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting retained the express consent requirement and the absolute
283. Id. art. IV.
284. Id. art. V.
285. The six taboo types of broadcasts were
(a) Broadcasts detrimental to the maintenance of international peace and security;
(b) Broadcasts representing interference in intra-State conflicts of any kind;

(c) Broadcasts involving an encroachment on fundamental human rights, on the dignity
and worth of the human person and on the fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion;
(d) Broadcasts propagandizing violence, horrors, pornography, and the use of narcotics;

(e) Broadcasts undermining the foundations of the local civilization, culture, way of
life, traditions or language;
(f)Broadcasts which misinform the public in these or other matters.
Id. art. VI.
286. Id. art. IX.
287. G.A. Res. 2916, supra note 280, at 17.
288. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1871, at 57-60 (1972); see also K. QUEENEY, supra note 265,
at 113-15.
289. U.N. Doc. AIC.1]PV. 1871, at 57 (1972).
290. United Nations Office of Public Information, Press Release UNESCO/2060 (Nov.
15, 1972); see also K. QUOENEY, supra note 265, at 115.
291. Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct
Television Broadcasting (1974), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105IWG.3(V)/CRP.1 and Corr. 1, reprinted
in U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/107, Annex II [hereinafter cited as 1974 Draft Convention].
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prohibition against certain programs, 292 but the Soviets substantially shortened the lengthy list of illegal broadcasts. 9 3 The 1974
version of principles also reduced the remedies available to states
receiving illegal broadcasts from "the means at its [state's] disposal" to those means "recognized as legal under international

law.,,129

By 1978 COPUOS had formulated a set of Draft Principles on
Direct Television Broadcasting, 5 but the Committee reached no
consensus on the provisions reflecting the basic tenets of the Soviet
position.29 8 For example, COPUOS drafted, but was unable to
adopt, a provision regarding the need for "strict respect" for national sovereignty and noninterference,297 provisions requiring
some type of consent or "consultation" between states before
broadcasting to a foreign state,9 provisions regulating program
29" and provisions
content,
defining illegal broadcasts.30 0 COPUOS
292. 1974 Draft Convention, supra note 291, art. V.
293. Id. art. IV.
°294. Id. art. IX.
295. Draft Principles on Direct Television Broadcasting, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/218, Annex II, at 3 (1978).
296. See id. at a.
297. The rejected provision would have recognized "that international direct broadcasting by means of artificial earth satellites should be based on strict respect for the sovereign rights of States and non-interference in their internal affairs." Id. at 3 (emphasis
added).
298. COPUOS' Draft Principles included the following provisions:
1. A direct television broadcasting service by means of artificial earth satellites specifically directed at a foreign State, which shall be established only when it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union, shall be based on appropriate agreements and/or arrangements between
the broadcasting and receiving States or the broadcasting entities duly authorized by
the respective States, in order to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds and to encourage co-operation in the field of information and the
exchange of information with other countries.
2. For that purpose a State which proposes to establish or authorize the establishment
of a direct television broadcasting service by means of artificial earth satellites specifically directed at a foreign State shall without delay notify that State of such intention
and shall promptly enter into consultations with that State if the latter so requests.
Id. at 6.
299. COPUOS' Draft Principles mandated that
States undertaking activities in direct television broadcasting by satellites should in all
cases exclude from the television progammes any material which is detrimental to the
maintenance of international peace and security, which publicizes ideas of war, militarism, national and racial hatred and enmity between peoples, which is aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs of other States or which undermines the foundations of
the local civilization, culture, way of life, traditions or language.
Id. at 7.
300. See id.
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in 1982, however, managed to agree on a set of principles that the
General Assembly, subsequently, adopted in a resolution."0 1 These
principles certainly favor the Soviet position over the American
viewpoint, but the developing countries' intermediate position espousing prior consultation-if not prior consent-seems to be the
ultimate victor.
C. The Results Thus Far in the Policy Debate-The Soviet and
Developing Nations' View Predominates
1.

The ITU's Radio Regulation 428A and WARC-ST 1977

The ITU provided one of the earliest forums for the debate on
content regulation. At WARC-71 the developing countries, among
others, called "for the revision of article 7 of the Radio Regulations
to ensure that before the establishment of a broadcasting-satellite
service, there should be a previous agreement among countries who
may not want such transmissions or whose services may be disturbed by spill-overs from such transmissions." s0 2 The result was a
revised article VII, embodied in Radio Regulation 428A, which obligates states to reduce the spillover effects of their broadcasts unless the affected states reach a prior agreement. The revised regulation states that "all technical means available shall be used to
reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, the radiation over the
territory of other countries unless an agreement has been previously reached with such countries." ' The results of WARC-ST77, in which the conference adopted a priori planning for frequency allocations in Regions One and Three, augmented the restrictive effect of Radio Regulation 428A.3 °1
In light of the revised Radio Regulation 428A and WARC-ST77, the United Kingdom submitted a working paper to the
COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee arguing that "[r]adical rethinking
[was] now necessary on the question of whether prior consent is
necessary in the Legal Sub-Committee."30 5 At the time this com301.

See infra part III, section C, subsection 6. See also Pace, supra note 3, at A6, col.

302.

Jasentuliyana, supra note 193, at 189, 203.

3.
303. ITU Radio Regulations 428A, ITU Radio Regulations and Additional Regulations
(1976), reprinted in 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note 193, at 51.

304.

Jasentuliyana, supra note 193, at 219. "The resulting allocations established a

system in which [DBS] can only be used for national service, and not international unless
states specifically agree to state-to-state broadcasting." Id.
305. United Kingdom, Working Paper on Elaboration of Principles Relating to Direct
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mittee of COPUOS had been working on draft principles related to
the use of DBS by different nations. The United Kingdom's position was that the existing technical requirements of the ITU were
the functional equivalent of a regime recognizing the principle of
prior consent. Operators could not transmit foreign DBS broadcasts without prior agreements, and any country violating the technical requirements dealing with state-to-state broadcasts would be
in breach of its ITU treaty obligations.806 Other members of the
COPUOS Committee, however, argued that "ITU regulations and
plans, important as they are in their technical and administrative
aspects, did not eliminate the inherent political and legal problems
in [DBS], which need clear, agreed legal principles to avoid future
conflicts.

30 7

The rejection of the British working paper should

have been predictable; a distinguishing feature of the debates surrounding DBS has been the constant demand for a "legal regime"
and the consistent refusal of a large majority of states to acquiesce
to any foreign DBS broadcasts without prior consent.308 As a result, the technological aspects of DBS have become the domain of
the ITU regime, while the resolution of the issues of prior consent
and content regulation is in the hands of UNESCO, COPUOS,
and, ultimately, the United Nations' General Assembly.
2. The 1972 UNESCO Declaration of Guiding Principles on the
Use of Satellite Broadcasting
The debates within UNESCO, culminating in the 1972 Declaration of Guiding Principles for the Use of Satellites, had the effect
of accelerating the work of the United Nations' COPUOS. As early
as 1962, UNESCO had begun to study the potential of space communications.309 At that same time the United Nations' COPUOS
was considering draft principles on the peaceful uses of outer
space. While the debates on these proposed principles stirred
much interest, the principles ultimately adopted in 1967 did not
address the issue of space communications. 10 In 1968 the United
Television Broadcasting by Satellites (Mar. 18, 1977), reprintedin 4 MANUAL ON SPAC- LAW,
supra note 193, at 238, 240.
306. United Kingdom, supra note 305, at 240; see also Jasentuliyana, supra note 193,
at 219-20.
307. Jasentuliyana, supra note 193, at 220. The author observes that "Argentina, Canada, Hungary and Sweden, among others, have expressed this view." Id. at 220 n.137.
308. Jakhu, Direct Broadcasting Via Satellite and A New Information Order,8 SmACUSR J. INV'L. L. & CoM. 374, 385-86 (1981).

309. K. QuEENEY, supra note 265, at 118.
310. See United Nations Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the

120
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Nations' General Assembly authorized COPUOS to embark upon a
specific study of the technical feasibility of DBS and the legal implications of its development.3 11 By 1972 both the United Nations'
General Assembly and UNESCO's General Conference debated the
issues of prior consent and program content. In the United Nations
the debate centered upon the Soviet Union's proposed convention
on principles governing the use of direct broadcasting 12 and a resolution calling for the formulation of a binding treaty.3 1 3 In
UNESCO the General Conference approved the Declaration of
Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the
Free Flow of Information and the Spread of Education and
3 14
Greater Cultural Exchange.
Although the language of the 1972 Declaration indicated generally that nations should not restrict unreasonably consent to receive broadcasts, 1 5 the Declaration "was not so much a balance
Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan.
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, reprinted in 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra
note 193, at 1. For a general background discussion of the Treaty, see Dembling, Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other CelestialBodies, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note 193, at 1.
Because the DBS broadcasts flow through satellites placed in the geostationary orbit,
the following issues are unclear: whether the 1967 Treaty principle regarding the peaceful
uses of outer space should dictate that DBS broadcasting activity must be for peaceful purposes; and whether transmissions flowing from this orbit are subject to national law. The
recent passage by the United Nations' General Assembly of principles governing the use by
states of artificial earth satellites for international direct television broadcasting significantly clarifies these issues of space law. For a discussion of the United Nations' 1982 DBS
principles, see infra notes 356-90 and accompanying text.
311. Dalfen, Direct Satellite Broadcasting,in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note
193, at 283; 4 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note 193, at 507. See also C. CHRISTOL, supra
note 260, at 617 (citing earlier General Assembly interest).
312. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
314. Records of the General Conference, UNESCO 17th Sess., vol. 1, U.N. Doc. 17 C/
Res. 4.111 (1972), reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/109 (1973), and in K. QUEENEY, supra
note 265, at 236-40 [hereinafter cited as 1972 UNESCO Declaration]. Ultimately, the United
Nations referred both the 1972 Soviet Draft Convention and the UNESCO Declaration to
COPUOS-the United Nations forum with proper jurisdiction over the issues relating to a
DBS legal regime. For a discussion on the question of internal authority between the United
Nations and UNESCO, see K. QUENEY, supra note 265, at 95-137; McWhinney, The Antimony of Policy and Function in the Institutionalizationof InternationalBroadcasting, 13
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3, 22 (1974). In 1973 the United Nations broadened COPUOS'
mandate by asking the Committee to discuss principles on the use of direct broadcasting by
member nations. See 4 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note 193, at 179.
315. The 1972 UNESCO Declaration states that "it is necessary that [Nations], taking
account of the principle of freedom of information, reach or promote prior agreements concerning direct satellite broadcasting to the population of countries other than the country of
origin of the transmission." 1972 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 314, art. IX(1).
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between two conflicting positions of national sovereignty and freedom of information as it was a ringing affirmation of 'prior consent'." 316 While compliance with the prior consent principle of the
1972 Declaration would not require explicit consent as, for example, the Soviet proposed convention would,3 17 the principle did
state that states should "reach or promote agreements" prior to
broadcasting.3 18 The Declaration's restrictions on commercial advertising and educational programs were the most stringent,
whereas the transmission limitations imposed upon news and cultural programs were the most lax. Transmissions of commercial advertising were to be subject to specific agreement, and each country had the right to decide the content of the educational programs
that its people received. 1 9 News broadcasts needed to be "factual"
and had to "identify [both] the body which assumes responsibility
for the news program as a whole" and news sources when appropriate. 2 ° Cultural programs were subject to few restrictions.3 2 '
While the 1972 UNESCO Declaration, like the 1972 Soviet
draft convention, clearly called for a regime of prior consent and
control over content, the two documents differ in several important
aspects. These differences illustrate that the developing countries'
concerns regarding DBS do not match the fears of the Soviet
Union. The 1972 UNESCO Declaration contained a sliding scale of
prior consent restrictions applying to four content categories. The
Soviets proposed broad content proscriptions against any foreign
broadcasts that might encroach on sovereignty over domestic affairs. The UNESCO Declaration subjected commercial advertising
to the greatest restrictions because developing countries fear for
both economic and political reasons that DBS will foster Western
tastes in their people. The political ideology of many nations will
not tolerate the cultural impurity that results from Western commercialism. Further, the economies of the developing nations cannot support the heavy cash requirements of the Western lifestyle.
The UNESCO Declaration subjected news and cultural programs
to the fewest restrictions, presumably because these broadcasts
tend to be the least disruptive to the economic systems of lessdeveloped nations.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

K. QUEENEY, supra note 265, at 117.
See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 315.
See 1972 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 314, art. XI(2), art.VI(2).
Id. art. V.
Id. art. VIII.
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After the 1972 UNESCO Declaration, UNESCO deferred work
in the area of space communication principles to the United Nations' COPUOS.

22

Although UNESCO's later work does not con-

cern DBS specifically, it has had important ramifications for the
global regime governing the flow of information and communications. For example, UNESCO's 1978 Declaration of Principles
Concerning the Use of the Mass Media, the "MacBride Report,"
and its Draft Medium-Term Plan for 1984-89 are three recent
UNESCO actions that affect the content control of DBS.
3. UNESCO's 1978 Mass Media Declaration
UNESCO's passage of the "Mass Media" Declaration3

2

sym-

bolized the organization's rejection of the "free flow of information" principle and acceptance of the principle of the "free and
balanced flow of information.

3

24

The Declaration stated that "the

strengthenihg of peace and international understanding, the promotion of human rights and the countering of racialism, apartheid
and incitement to war demand a free flow and a wider and better
balanced dissemination of information. To this end, the mass media have a leading contribution to make.

' 325

While affirming the

basic principle of freedom of the press, however, the Declaration
contained numerous statements that would seem to undercut free
speech.

26

The Mass Media Declaration aroused great concern among
Western observers. For example, the New York Times argued that
the Declaration:
defines the press not as a bearer of tidings, good and bad, but as a political
agent in the causes of strengthening peace and understanding, promoting
human rights and countering racism, apartheid and incitement to war. The
declaration .

.

. concludes with an oblique [reference to] the international

convention on Civil and Political Rights [of the United Nations], which stipulates that war propaganda and incitement to discrimination shall be prohibited by law. To Americans there can be no "free speech" or "balanced" news
322. See id.

323. The formal name is the Declaration of Fundamental Principles Concerning the
Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding,
the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to

War.

324.
OBSTACLES

C. HAMELINK, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ORDER: DEVELOPMENT AND

17-20 (1980); see also Masmoudi, The New World Information Order,29 J. COM-

MUNICATIONS 172 (1979).
325. Mass Media Declaration, Records of the General Conference, UNESCO 20th

Sess., U.N. Doc. 4/9.3/2, at 100-04 (1978).

326. See, e.g., id. arts. I, III(1), IV, VI, VIII & X(3).
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unless3 1those
who advocate racism and apartheid and, yes, war are also free to
7
speak.

Although the United States perceived the Declaration as an attempt to legitimize government control and censorship of the
press, the developing nations argued that the principles sought "to
promote [the] decolonization and democratization of communication structures and contents" from the West's dominance and allow the question of controls to be "left for each society to settle in
accordance with national laws and practices. 3 28 In addition, developing nations pointed out that the "free-flow" principle of the
West disguises a one-way flow of information with the developing
nations as recipients. 2 9 These nations also argued that no "free
flow" can exist until their countries possess their own communications infrastructures and trained personnel capable of using
them.3 s0 Finally, the developing nations argued that to have a truly
balanced flow of information, an internationally accepted right of
reply and correction must exist.33 '
327. Androunas & Zassoursky, UNESCO's Mass Media Declaration: A Forum of
Three Worlds, 29 J. COMMUNICATIONS 186, 189 (1979) (quoting the N.Y. Times, Nov. 27,
1978, at A35, col. 1) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Convention on Civil and
Political Rights mentioned in the N.Y. Times article, see infra note 361.
328. Nordenstreng, U.S. Policy and the Third World, 32 J. COMMUNICATIONS 54, 55
(1982).
329. Being on the "receiving end" of global information flow means more than just a
lack of communications infrastructure. See infra note 330. To developing countries, it
means that they are not capable of communicating their version of global events.
330. Though developing countries lack basic communications infrastructures, they
particularly lack equipment geared towards the production of their own information. Moreover, the little equipment they do have tends to be of the "receiving-end" type. See B.
SIGNrrzER, supra note 265, at 84. The 1980 MacBride Report is a good UNESCO study of
the contemporary imbalances in communications infrastructures. See infra notes 332-42 and
accompanying text. Most recently, UNESCO's Draft Medium-Term Plan for 1984-89 emphasized the continuing imbalances in this area:
The huge disparities that exist at the international level in the production and circulation of messages and programmes is today a recognized fact. In 1978, the developing
countries, representing 70 percent of the world's population, commanded only a small
fraction of the media of communication: ... 27 percent of radio transmitters, 18 percent of radio receivers, 5 percent of television transmitters and 12 percent of television
receivers .... [T]hese disparities ... have ... been constantly increasing as technology has developed.
Draft Medium-Term Plan for 1984-89, Records of the General Conference, UNESCO 4th
Extraordinary Sess., U.N. Doc. 4/XC/4, at 81-82 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Draft MediumTerm Plan for 1984-89].
331. For example, the Director-General of UNESCO, Amodou Mahtar M'Bow, explained the importance of the principle of respecting the right of reply and correction.
While criticizing the failure of the Western press to publish his corrections, he stated:
the newspapers or the media presenting UNESCO programmes or the so-called attitudes of UNESCO, have never deigned to publish the corrections made by UNESCO.
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Although the Mass Media Declaration did not proscribe specific types of content, the Declaration's prescriptive terms define
the ends that the media should serve and, by implication, restrict
any media content that does not serve those ends.
4. The 1980 MacBride Report
The MacBride Report, issued in 1980 by UNESCO's International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, did
not address directly DBS content regulation, but the report did
lend factual and ideological support to the Soviet and developing
countries' position.3 3 2 The report documented the imbalances
among nations in the flow of information and in the availability of
communications technology and also raised "some disturbing questions about the relationship between modern telecommunications
and information technologies and the production and delivery of
mass media programming. '3 33 Moreover, it suggested "a panoply of
changes to existing international regulations and agreements, and
propos[ed] the formulation of new legal tools to ensure more equitable access to and use of modern information and communica33 4
tions technology in the developing worlds.
While the twenty-first General Conference of UNESCO endorsed the Report, the paper's eighty-two recommendations for the
implementation of its objectives received no endorsement. 3 5 Instead, the General Conference called for the creation of the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC),
which would facilitate the growth of national communication infrastructures and the improvement of personnel quality within the
developing countries.3 36 The United Nations' General Assembly

.. . If the information media have the liberty to say what they like, then others have
the right to judge what they say. What becomes of freedom when people ... refuse to
allow others to judge what they say? When this is the case, there is no liberty but a
monopoly ....
We should then have come to a regime, to a system, which would not
only be a monopoly system but a dictatorial system where liberty would be absent.
UNESCO Press Release No. 88, Paris, France (Dec. 1982). See also Masmoudi, supra note
324, at 175-76.
1 332. INT'L COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS, MANY VOICES, ONE
WORLD (1980).

333.

Bortnick, InternationalInformation Flow: The Developing World Perspective,
L.J. 333, 346 (1981).
334. Id. at 347.
335. Belgrade 1980: Breakdown or Breakthrough?, I CHRON. INT'L COM., Jan.-Feb.
1980, at 2.
336. Special Political Comm. Questions Relating to Information, 35 U.N. GAOR An.
14

CORNELL INT'L
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subsequently endorsed UNESCO's IPDC plan in a two-part resolution.3 37 The first part of the resolution endorsed the IPDC alone,
and the second part endorsed it as one of a number of United Nations activities that would serve to foster the "establishment of a
new, more just and more effective world information and communication order . . . based on the free circulation and wider and
a
better balanced dissemination of information."
The role that the IPDC will play in a DBS regime is unclear.
Mustapha Masmoudi, a leading advocate for the position of the
developing nations, has suggested that the IPDC should become a
central supervisory body serving "to coordinate the development of
international communications cooperation." 33 9 The tasks of such a
body might include the collection of "monies to be deposited as
compensation for the use of the geostationary orbit and as contributions toward space communications development in Third
World countries, and generally to respond to all questions arising
from [nontechnical] cooperation and coordination in the communications field. 3 40 Masmoudi's proposed supervisory body also might
"deal with the question of broadcast programming and content. '" 1
Perhaps, because of the potentiality the IPDC holds for serving
such a role, the United States, after its initial enthusiasm for the
IPDC proposal, now has cooled in its support.s
5. UNESCO's Medium-Term Draft Plan for 198489-Programme Ill-Communication in the Service of Man
The latest step in UNESCO's development of a regulatory system for DBS is its December 3, 1982, adoption of Major Programme III-"Communication in the Service of Man," which is
one of several programs in its Draft Medium-Term Plan for 198489." In this plan UNESCO actively attempts to coordinate two of
its major programs: "Communication in the Service of Man" and
nex (unedited Agenda Item 59), U.N. Doc. A/35/765 (1980).
337. Nordenstreng, supra note 328, at 57.
338. Id.
339. Masmoudi, The New World Information Order and Direct BroadcastingSatel-

lites, 8 SRAIcusE J.

INT'L

L. & COM. 323, 341 (1981).

340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Nordenstreng, supra note 328, at 58.
343. Draft Medium-Term Plan for 1984-89, supra note 330, at 79. Significantly, "Communication in the Service of Man" is based on the provisions of the 1978 Mass Media Declaration as well as upon UNESCO's resolutions adopted at the twenty-first conference in
Belgrade, during which the MacBride Report was discussed.
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Such coordi-

nation of information flows and communication programs illustrates UNESCO's efforts to work towards the creation of a New
World Information and Communication Order (NICO). 3s "
UNESCO efforts are not aimed merely at the creation of a New
World Information Order (NIO), as most Western writers refer to
it. Instead, UNESCO envisions a new order that links the flow of
information to communication systems.
Aspects of NICO may have a direct effect on DBS. For example, the goals of preserving cultural identity and traditional national heritage 34 1 will require "safeguard[s] from the intellectual
influence of the communications industry over the minds of citizens"347 and "impeding external intrusions, to thwart cultural and
intellectual dependence, the main source of technological, economic and political alienation." 4 ' Perhaps most importantly,
NICO symbolizes "the right of each nation to utilize its own communication system to protect its sovereignty, defend its political,
moral and cultural values, and communicate its interests and aspi9
3'
rations to the world.

4

As UNESCO's Draft Medium-Term Plan contemplates, a web
of independent national information policies will serve to foster a
NICO. The plan includes the encouragement of national information policies as one of its objectives in the furtherance of this new
order.350 Accordingly, numerous developing nations and many
Western European nations have begun to adopt their own information policies-known in United Nations jargon as national in344. Id.
345. Id. In the major program, "Communication in the Service of Man," the section
laying out the program's strategy illustrates the breadth of issues upon which NICO
touches. These issues include eliminating information monopolies, balancing the flow of information, having developed countries aid developing countries in creating their own media,
respecting cultural and ethnic diversity, and encouraging ethnic and social groups to participate in the communications process. Id. at 83.
346. One of the objectives of the "Communication in the Service of Man" program is:
(c) to encourage efforts to devise solutions matching the needs and values of each people; however, safeguarding pluralism, which necessarily implies respect for cultural
identities, does not debar us from seeking to define bases for action and common objectives in the field of communication, rooted in interests that are tending to converge in
an ever more interdependent world ....

Id. at 84.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Masmoudi, supra note 339, at 327.
Id.
Id. at 329.
See Draft Medium-Term Plan for 1984-89, supra note 330, at 84.
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51

While the creation of independent national communications
infrastructures is the immediate goal of these policies, the policies
also indirectly tend to regulate content, and, therefore, may influence the regulation of DBS in the future. 52 For example, the executive secretary of Brazil's informatics policy states that:
[t]he aim of such control is not to restrain the information flow but rather to
give commercial reciprocity to the exchange of information among countries.
It concerns the use of data banks, software, data processing capability and
other facilities. In terms of strategy, it is fundamental that a country have
control over the information resources essential to its sovereignty and development. Thus, the international commerce of information products and services must be submitted to conditions related to their content. 5 3

Although the Brazilian plan does not illustrate the present potential for information policies to affect the content regulation of
incoming DBS programs, Canada's informatics policies do demonstrate this potential. As noted in a recent House Report on DBS:
"'The Canadian government views communications and information resources as being very important to its economy, and the influx of non-Canadian (mostly American) content in publishing,
broadcasting, and film products is seen as a serious threat to a uni351. Informatics policies are predicated on the belief that information is a sovereign
resource and that every nation has the right to nurture and obtain the benefits flowing from
this resource. See, e.g., Bortnick, supra note 333; Eger, The Global Phenomenon of
Teleinformatics: An Introduction, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203 (1981); Ramsey, Europe Responds to the Challenge of The New Information Technologies: A Teleinformatics Strategy for the 1980's, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 237 (1981). As the Intergovernmental Bureau of
Informatics of the United Nations has defined it, informatics is "the rational and systematic
application of information to economic, social and political development." UNITED NATIONS
INTERGOVERNMENTAL BUREAU FOR INFORMATICS, INFORMATICS: ITS POLITICAL IMPACT

2 (1980).

By the late 1970's, over 60 nations already had adopted some official information policy.
Pipe, National Policies, InternationalDebates, 29 J. COMMUNICATIONS 114, 121 (Summer
1979). Most of these countries "have enacted legislation creating an administrative authority
to direct and coordinate the procurement of data processing equipment and training operators, and to set priorites in its use and application." Id.
352. At present, the United States appears to be more concerned with the impact of
national informatics policies on its capability to export information and services than with
the impact of national informatics policies on content regulation or the free flow of information as it relates to barriers to transborder data flows. See, e.g., SENATE COMM.ON COMMUNICATIONS, SCIENCE AND TRANSP., REPORT ON S.246: INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION ACT
OF 1982, S.REP. No. 669, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); International Telecommunications
Deregulation Act of 1982: Hearings on S.2469 before the Senate Subcomm. on Communications of the Comm. on Communications, Science, and Transp., 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982).
353. Address by Joubert de Olivera Brizida, Executive Secretary of the Brazilian Special Secretariat of Informatics, 1980 Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics Conference
on Transborder Data Flow Policies, in Rome, Italy (June 23, 1980), reprinted in 3 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No.
, 33-34 (1980).
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fled sense of Canadian identity.' "" Having adopted such a broad
definition of the proper parameters of national sovereignty, Canada has used this "expansive definition . . . to justify even rec-

ommendations concerning foreign programming on Canadian television.

3

55

Nonetheless, one only can speculate upon the impact of

a nationally integrated information policy on DBS.
6. The 1982 United Nations' Resolution of Principles On the Use
of DBS by States
In December 1982 the United Nations' General Assembly
overwhelmingly passed over the objections of the United States
and its allies a DBS resolution that calls for strict governmental
controls on international satellite transmissions."' The New York
Times reported that the resolution, the culmination of fourteen
years of work by the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee, endorses the
right of nations "to veto any incoming television broadcasts by satellite from abroad.

3 57

Although United Nations resolutions of this

kind are not binding under international law, the resolution indicates the form that a more binding document, such as an interna-

tional convention, might take. 35 s Furthermore, it indicates the di-

rection of international consensus on the issue of DBS and the
struggle that the United States and its allies face if they wish to
preserve the free flow of information.
354.

HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES: IN-

DOMESTIC REGULATION, H.R. REP. No. 730, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1982).
355. Eger, supra note 351, at 231.
356. These principles are the current last word on the issues of prior consent and sovereignty. The vote was 108 to 13 with 13 abstentions. The countries voting against the adoption of the principles were: the United States, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, West Germany,
Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain. Pace, supra
note 263, at A6, col. 3.
On November 22, 1982, by a vote of 88 to 15, with 11 abstentions, the Special Political
Committee of the United Nations approved the draft principles of COPUOS' Legal Subcommittee, and, subsequently, referred them to the General Assembly. Static over the
Skywaves, III CHRON. OF INT'L COM., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 2.
Significantly, the Special Political Committee's approval came under the heading of a
resolution entitled "Preparation Of An International Convention On Principles Governing
The Use By States Of Artificial Earth Satellites For Direct Television Broadcasting." U.N.
Doc. A/SPC/37/L.5/Rev. 1 (Agenda Item 63) (1982). In addition to the title of the resolution
foreshadowing a possible move toward a DBS convention in the future, the New York Times
in reporting on the United Nations' endorsement of the principles stated that: "[t]he principles it contains . . . are widely expected here to serve as a basis for negotiations on an
international convention." Pace, supra note 263, at A6, col. 1.
357. Pace, supra note 263, at A6, col. 1.
358. See supra note 356.
TERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION AND
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(a) Noncontroversial DBS Principles
The members of the COPUOS Working Group by 1981 had
obtained consensus on seven of the resolution's ten principles.
These principles included: (1) the overall purposes and objectives
of the DBS principles; (2) the applicability of international law; (3)
the rights and benefits of states under these principles; (4) international cooperation; (5) the peaceful settlement of disputes; (6)
copyright and neighboring rights under DBS; and (7) the duty to
notify the United Nations of state activities with DBS 5 9 Among
the "purposes and objectives" that should guide the use of DBS,
the principle of the sovereign right to nonintervention in domestic
affairs is given equal weight with the principle of a person's right
to seek, receive, and impart information.3 6 0 The use of DBS must
be compatible with both of these principles as well as the "ideas as
enshrined in the relevant U.N. instruments. ' 6 ' Perhaps most im359. These principles entered the text of the Working Group's drafts "unbracketed"-in other words, debate on these principles had ceased. The number of noncontroversial or unbracketed principles has fluctuated. By 1978, the Working Group's draft had nine
unbracketed provisions. 1978 COPUOS Working Group's Draft, U.N. Doe. AIAC.105/218,
Annex 11 (1978), reprinted in 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note 193, at 105. By 1981,
however, the Working Group's draft had only seven unbracketed provisions; the provisions
that went from being "unbracketed" to "bracketed" from 1978 to 1981 were the sections on
"state responsibility" and "duty and right to consult." See 1981 Working Group's Draft,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/288, Annex 11 (1981).
360. United Nations Resolution of Principles on the Use of DBS by States, G.A. Res.
92, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 98, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982
United Nations Resolution].
361. Id. That DBS activities should be conducted in a manner that is consistent with
both the principles of nonintervention and the free flow of information is a blow to the
United States' desire to hold the principle of the free flow of information supreme regardless
of borders. The United States, in short, considers the free-flow principle immune to compromises stemming from the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs. Furthermore,
that this section of the United Nations' DBS principles also states that DBS broadcasts
should be conducted in a manner that is compatible with ideas "enshrined in the relevant
U.N. instruments" indicates that the principles embodied in instruments such as the United
Nations' Declaration on Human Rights, the United Nations' Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the 1972 UNESCO Declaration of Guiding Principles for the Use of Satellite
Communications are all equally applicable and further diminish the status of the free-flow
principle. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 22, states that
the "national effort and international co-operation" should be used to protect "cultural
rights." G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 22 (1948). The United Nations' Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted &
opened for signature,ratification& accession by G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316/52 (1966), also leaves nations substantial latitude to restrict the
flow of information to individuals if they consider such restrictions necessary. Article 19 of
the Covenant states:
1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include free-
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portantly, DBS broadcasters must pay "due respect ... to the po3' 6 2
litical and cultural integrity of states.
A further glance at the "noncontroversial principles" reveals
that the states for which the principles are most concerned are the
lesser-developed nations. Under the provisions concerning "international cooperation" and "copyright and neighboring rights,"
states must "give special consideration to the interests of developing countries in the use of direct television broadcasting [by satellites] for the purpose of accelerating their national development. ' 363 Under the section on "purposes and objectives,"
countries engaged in DBS activities "should . . assist in educational, social and economic development, particularly in the developing countries. 3 6 4 Last, according to the provision on "rights and
benefits," "[e]very state has an equal right to conduct [DBS] activities;" and "[a]ccess to the technology in this field should be available to all states without discrimination on terms mutually agreed
by all concerned." 6 5 This last provision is a direct reference to the
controversies over the allocation of DBS frequencies and access to
the geostationary orbit.
dom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media
of his choice.
3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions,
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security, of public order (order public), or of
public health or morals.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra, art. 19 (emphasis added). Finally, the document that is most compromising to the principle of the free flow of information and that gives a state the most latitude to decide what is acceptable information is the
1972 UNESCO Declaration of Guiding Principles. See supra part III, section C, subsection
2. Part 2 of Article VII of the Declaration states that DBS broadcasts of cultural programs
"should respect the distinctive character, the value and the dignity of each, and the right of
all countries and peoples to preserve their cultures as part of the common heritage of mankind." 1972 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 314, art. VII(2).
This Article has singled out these instruments for discussion because their principles
are illustrative of the host of principles that the phrase "ideas . . . enshrined in relevant
U.N. instruments" may encompass.
362. 1982 United Nations Resolution, supra note 360. Of course, this provision is significant in that it may tip the balance between the free-flow-of-information principle and
the nonintervention principle in favor of the latter. See supra text accompanying note 361.
363. 1982 United Nations Resolution, supra note 360. The phrase "by satellites" appears only in the "international cooperation" provision.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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(b) ControversialDBS Principles

For a long time the greatest stumbling block in COPUOS's va-

rious groups has been the issue of whether a DBS broadcaster
must obtain the prior consent of the receiving nation before it can
transmit any broadcast into that nation. The complement to that
controversy is whether the receiving state should have the authority to censor or restrict the program content of incoming transmission." 6' The third outstanding and connected issue relates "to possible recourses states might have against unwanted broadcasts. 3 67
Compared to previous drafts of the Working Group of COPUOS,
the DBS principles in final form are surprisingly moderate in their
requirements for obtaining prior consent and, even more surpris-

ingly, practically silent on the issues of program content and recourse for the unwilling recipient of DBS transmissions.
(1) Program Content and Recourse for the Unwilling DBS
Recipient
As late as 1981, the Working Group's draft contained a principle on program content that was reminiscent of the 1972 Soviet
proposed convention, the 1972 UNESCO Declaration of Guiding
Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting, and the 1978
UNESCO Mass Media Declaration. The proposed provision re-

stricted commercial advertising and directed that all broadcasts:
should in all cases exclude . .. any material which is detrimental to the
maintenance of international peace and security, which publicizes ideas of
war, militarism, national and racial hatred and enmity between peoples,
which is aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs of other States or which
undermines the foundations of the local civilization, culture, way of life, tra366. From the American point of view, the two key issues indeed have been "prior
consent" and "programme content." See, e.g., Note, Toward the Free Flow of Information:
Direct Television Broadcastingvia Satellite, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 329, 330 (1979).
The United States distinguishes between prior consent and program content-concepts
frequently lumped together, see, e.g., Jasentuliyana, supra note 193, at 218-because the
latter principle is much more of an anathema to the United States than the former, although the United States does not accept either principle. Of course, a regime accepting the
principle of prior consent, by operation, might allow a country to screen content by simply
refusing to grant consent to the broadcast. Nonetheless, this utilization of a prior consent
provision would be more tolerable than a principle that universally holds certain program
contents to be unlawful and inadmissible on their face.
367. Although not discussed as much as the issues of prior consent and program content, the issue of possible recourses that nations might have against unwanted broadcasts
has remained a controversial outstanding issue in the DBS debates. See Dalfen, supra note
311, at 291. The present principles now call upon nations to act within the principles of
international law and to settle their disputes peacefully in accordance with the principles of
the United Nations.
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ditions or language.3 68

The present DBS principles do not include this provision.8 9
The United Nations' present principles do contain a section
on "state responsibility" that appears to be a compromise version
37 0
of a former draft section on "unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts.
The original provision on "unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts"
would have permitted each state to decide what broadcasts it considered inadmissible; thus, the principles would have left the decisions regarding content entirely to the receiving state's discretion.3 7 1 Further, the former draft section would have called upon
states to "agree to give every assistance in stopping unlawful direct
television broadcasting by satellite. 37 2 Finally, the original provision touched upon the notion of prior consent by regarding as "unlawful and as giving rise to the international liability of States"
DBS broadcasts that were transmitted without permission or received as a result of spillover "if the broadcasting State had refused to hold appropriate consultations with the State in which the
broadcasts [were] received. 37 3 A comparison of the language of the
proposed provision on unlawful and inadmissible broadcasts with
the final "state responsibility" principle.reveals compromises. The
present language reads that "[s]tates should bear international responsibility for activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite carried out by them or under their
jurisdiction and for the conformity of any such activities with the
37 4
principles set forth in this document.
(2) Prior Consent
The two most controversial concepts during the debates on the
draft principles were the provisions on "duty and right to consult"
and "consultations and agreements between states ' 715 -the provisions pertaining to prior consent. Throughout the years, numerous
countries submitted draft provisions. The provisions that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted
and the joint proposal of Canada and Sweden illustrate the range
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

1981 COPUOS Working Group's Draft, supra note 359, at 7.
See 1982 United Nations Resolution, supra note 360.
Id.
See 1981 COPUOS Working Group's Draft, supra note 359, at 7.
Id.
Id.
1982 United Nations Resolution, supra note 360.
Id.
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of approaches taken by countries. 76
The Soviet Union asked for a binding obligation to obtain express consent prior to broadcasts. 3 " The United Kingdom's position was that the relevant instruments of the ITU provided an adequate framework for consultations and arrangements and
instituted an obligation for transmitting nations to obtain prior
consent because without doing so a broadcasting state would be in
breach of its ITU treaty obligations.3 78 The United States agreed
with the British position, but made additional arguments that "unnecessary political restraints would reduce the use of satellites and
thus inhibit the growth of space technology." The United States
further suggested that "until adequate practical experience has
been gained on the use of DBS, no international political limitations on use should be imposed. 3 79 The United States' proposal
for prior consent would have required a broadcasting state to notify a receiving state of its intention and "promptly enter into consultations with that State if the latter so requests." 8 0 While a
broadcaster was to give "due regard to the interests and concerns
of the foreign State . . .[a]ny such consultations should also be
premised upon facilitating a free flow and a wider dissemination of
information." 38' The United States version would have allowed
great flexibility in the form that these consultations might take,
leaving a broad range within which to negotiate broadcasting services on a bilateral basis.
The Canadian-Swedish principles, which formed the basis of
the compromise working paper in 1979, contained a draft provision
that called for prior' consent on the basis of "agreements and/or
arrangements" which were not inconsistent with the regulations of
376. For illustrations of the position that the Soviet Union has taken, see supra part
III, section B, subsection 3. See also Soviet Submission to the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.89 (1973), reprintedin 4 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note
193, at 194-99. For an illustration of the United Kingdom's position, see its working paper
submitted to the Legal Sub-Committee, supra note 305. For an illustration of the American
position, see the American working paper submitted to the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee,
1979 United States Working Paper, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.118 (1979), reprinted in 4
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note 193, at 251-52. For the Canadian-Swedish position, see
the proposed set of draft principles submitted to the COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee, 1979
Canadian-Swedish Draft Principles, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.117 (1979), reprinted in 4
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note 193, at 249-51.
377. See supra part III, section B, subsection 3.
378. See United Kingdom, supra note 305.
379. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 266, at 352.
380. 1979 United States Working Paper, supra note 376, at 252.
381. Id.
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the ITU 82s The Canadian-Swedish proposal would not have required express consent; informal arrangements would be in compliance with the principle. This concept of consultation followed by
arrangements or agreements "has been referred to as 'the key part
of the key principle.' ",383 The United Nations' present DBS principles contain this compromise position. The Canadian-Swedish
draft also balanced the duty and the right to consultation between
the state desiring to initiate the broadcast and the state intending
to receive the proposed broadcast. The broadcasting state had the
duty to initiate consultations, and the receiving state had the duty
to enter into consultations. 8 4 This version provided the receiving
state with "a much broader base for seeking consultations." 38 5 The
United Nations' present DBS principles incorporate this Canadian-Swedish proposal as well.
On April 3, 1981, in a significant step towards compromise,
twelve member countries of the COPUOUS Legal Sub-Committee
presented a set of proposed draft principles deleting the principles
on "programme content" and "unlawful/inadmissible broadcasts."38 6 This set of draft principles formed the final basis for
later negotiations. 7 Besides removing the two controversial provisions, the twelve-country draft set forth an entirely new section
concerning the nature of the consultative process following the establishment of a DBS service between the broadcasting and receiving state.3 88 Furthermore, it extended the right to request consultations and the duty to enter into them to any other broadcasting or
receiving state "within the same service."389 The countries were to
conduct these consultations without prejudice to other consultations which other States "may undertake with any other State on
382. 1979 Canadian-Swedish Draft Principles, supra note 376, at 251.
383. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 260, at 687. See generally id. at 686-88.
384. Id. at 685-86.
385. Id. at 686.
386. Twelve-Country Draft Principles, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.131 (1981); U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/288, Annex IV (1981). For a discussion of the 1981 12-country working paper, see C. CHRISTOL, supra note 260, at 698-703. Notably, the 12 countries were from
neither the West nor the Soviet bloc; the countries were Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, and Venezuela.
387. Compare Twelve-Country Draft Principles, supra note 386, with 1982 United Nations Resolution, supra note 360.
388. See Twelve-Country Draft Principles, supra note 386; C. CHRISTOL, supra note
260, at 698-703. The twelve-country draft principles shifted the section previously titled
"right and duty to consult" to the section now labeled "consultations and agreements"; despite this shift, however, the section is more or less the same as when Canada and Sweden
first presented it in their draft principles in 1979.
389. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 260, at 701.

19841

DBS DEBATE

that subject."3 90 The proposals were significant because they extended the right and duty to consult to parties beyond a specific
sending and receiving nation, thus allowing simultaneous consultations among a number of nations within the same service range
and permitting the simultaneous existence of diverse arrangements
between different states within the same service. The principles
that the United Nations' General Assembly endorsed incorporate
these features.
(c) Summary
Despite the United Kingdom's arguments that the ITU's
"technical requirements" and system of a priori allocation sufficiently establish the principles of prior consent under international
law, other nations have felt that a legal regime is needed to regulate the use of DBS by states. In December 1982 the United Nations' General Assembly took the first step towards the creation of
such a legal regime by approving a set of principles confronting
this issue. These principles indicate that the duty to consult with a
nation prior to broadcasting and the right of a receiving nation to
request such consultations, in addition to the duty to enter agreements or arrangements prior to broadcasting, will be at the heart
of any future convention.
While the United Nations' present DBS principles impliedly
allow a state to pass on the contents of programs by their right to
refuse broadcasting services, they do not expressly prohibit certain
program content as previous working drafts had proposed. In addition, they do not label as "illegal" or "unlawful" broadcasts that
are sent without prior consultations, agreements, and arrangements. The DBS principles merely call upon the states to settle
their disputes peacefully.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS FOR

DBS

The momentum in the United Nations for prior restraints on
the content of DBS programs is at odds with the technological ambitions of the few developed countries. Although the United States
has not yet had to decide whether to sign a multilateral convention
that would impose prior constraints on DBS broadcasting, the time
for such a decision looms in the near future. The question in this
turbulent atmosphere, thus, becomes whether the United States
390. Id. The 1982 United Nations Resolution, supra note 360, contains the same provision, under the title "duty and right to consult." See id.
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still can find a way to lead technologically, while being sensitive to,
and compromising upon, cultural and political issues.
One way for nations to avoid the particular pitfalls of the
United Nations debate is to work bilaterally; countries are not confined to multilateral arrangements. Accordingly, developed countries already have negotiated successfully bilateral treaties and
working arrangements between themselves and with the developing countries. Moreover, with DBS technology so far beyond the
grasp of an impoverished nation,3 9 1 developing countries will form
consortia, regional arrangements, and bilateral agreements to get
their projects off the ground. So long as restraints in any multilateral convention do not exceed radically the restrictions that bilateral parties desire, and the regimes that the convention establishes
are flexible and conciliatory, an interwoven regulatory system consisting of externally imposed convention principles and self-imposed bilateral contract provisions should work. Indeed, the ITU
has encouraged bilateral regimes to solve problems of frequency
sharing, broadcast spillover, and even prior consent. 9 2
391.
The development, construction, launch, operation and control of a single broadcasting

satellite today, depending upon satellite size and complexity, would cost at least $100
million and could cost as much as $200 million, just to place the satellite operationally
available, in orbit, with necessary tracking, telemetry, and control systems in place.
Doyle, International Satellite Communications and the New Information Order: Distressing Broadcasting Satellites, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 365, 366-67 (1981). See also

Pritchard & Kase, Getting Set for Direct BroadcastingSatellites, SPECTRUM, Apr. 1981, at
22.

392. Cross-border broadcasting is permissible under the plan established by WARCBS-77, if agreed to under a bilateral regime. Warren, A Canadian Perspective on Direct
Broadcast Satellites and the New World Information and Communication Order, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 391, 393-94 (1981). See also FINAL ACTS of the WARC-79, Ge-

neva, III, RR7-1, art. 7, paras. 1,2,5. Paragraph one permits two or more members, under the
provisions of Article 31 of the Convention, to conclude special arrangements regarding the

suballocation of bands of frequencies to the appropriate services of the participating
countries.

The terms of bilateral agreements may include shared risk, commercial and experimental joint ventures, trade, aid, and instructional programs. Activities that bilateral arrangements govern may include:

(a) provision of a launch for satellites;
(b) the loan of an orbiting satellite or of part of its capacity;
(c) the loan of ground equipment;

(d) provision of sounding rockets for scientific experiments;
(e) provision of tracking support for satellites;

(f) permitting the reception of data;
(g) exchange or provision of scientific or other data;

(h) provision of training facilities;
(i) provision of advice and consultancy;
(j) joint planning, development and manufacturing of satellite systems;
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A.

Canada and the United States

Canada and the United States share the most complex and sophisticated bilateral communications relationship that exists between any two countries.3 9 3 The relationship began in 1962 with
the launching by NASA of Canadian fixed satellite Alouette I.9

Most of the subsequent projects have followed the principles for
bilateral coordination articulated for that venture. 9 5
The United States and Canada began coordinating DBS
projects in the late 1960's. The coordinated efforts began with the
Communications Technology Satellite (CTS or HERMES), which
used the 12-14 GHz bands and low-cost transportable ground terminals.39 6 Canada developed and built the CTS that the United

States launched in 1976. The satellite remained in orbit for three
years and the nations used it on alternate days for experimental
purposes such as teleconferencing, telemedicine, health care, and
community educational and special services. 97 The CTS project
was successful for both countries-it provided the United States
with an opportunity for further development of DBS technology
and helped propel Canada to the forefront of space technology as a
manufacturer of broadcast satellites. Moreover, the CTS project
proved the feasibility of using the 12-14 GHz bands and laid the
groundwork for the future use of small and inexpensive, individual
earth terminals.3 9s Encouraged by the success of CTS, both countries have planned further joint and independent programs.3

99

GT

Satellite, an American corporation, plans to use the Canadian
ANIK-B satellite to broadcast commercially in the United
States.4 0 0 The bilateral arrangement in this instance is between a
(k) integration of payloads/experiments of one country in another's satellites.
Report of UNCEPUOS, supra note 189, at 85-86.
393. See Warren, supra note 392, at 391.
394. N. MATTE, AEROSPACE LAW 160 (1982).
395. These principles include:
1. No funds were to cross the border at the government to government level.
2. Tasks were defined at each level.
3. Each country was to be responsible for its part of the program.
4. The technical, managerial, and financial interfaces between the two countries
were carefully defined.
id. at 161.
396. Id. at 162.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Interview with Keith Fagan, General Counsel's Office at Satellite Television Corporation (STC), in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 16, 1983).
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private American firm and a publicly owned Canadian utility.
B.

France and Germany

Inspired by their successful joint venture with the Symphonie
satellites that the two nations used for telecommunications and
nonprofit experiments, 40 1 France and the Federal Republic of Germany decided in 1979 to develop jointly an operational direct television broadcast satellite system.0 2 This prompted their withdrawal from the European regional experiment in H-Sat which was
to have a similar function. 40 3 The West Germans and the French
decided to enter a joint venture for DBS because they wanted to
avoid the complications and potential delays of a multilateral venture.4 °4 The system was scheduled for launching at the end of 1983,
and the two countries planned to set up a bilateral organization to
manage it. 40 5 In keeping with the bilateral concept, the nations
planned to establish the organization along the lines of the body
that managed the Symphonie satellites. 0 6 In the Symphonie agreement two management groups were formed: (1) a Board of Directors, with three members elected by each country; and (2) an Executive Committee, to manage the technical and financial aspects of
the program. The agreement required the Board to take action
only when unanimous agreement existed between the representatives of the countries.0 7
The new "TV-SAT" effort between France and Germany is
expected to earn substantial profits. Other neighboring European
countries probably will rent the use of spare DBS channels. Moreover, their system most likely will attract contracts to build additional systems and other space hardware for the rest of Europe. 408
The joint venture is both public and private in nature. The respective governments negotiated the agreements but the governments
planned to designate private firms in each country to be the major
401. The Consortium Industriel Franco-Allemand pour Symphonie built the
Symphonie Satellities for experimental purposes. The first satellite was launched into the
geostationary orbit in 1974. See N. MATrE supra note 394, at 162.
402. See N. MATTE, supra note 394, at 181; Basset, French, Germans to Begin TV-Sat
Effort, AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 10, 1979, at 96.

403.

Grandi & Richeri, Western Europe: The Development of DBS Systems, 30 J.
172 (1980).
404. Id.
405. See Bassett, supra note 402, at 96.
406. Id.
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participants in the arrangement. The apportionment of shares was
forty-six percent French and fifty-four percent German. 40 9
C.

The United States and the Developing Countries
1.

India

India was the first country to use DBS to transmit educational
information directly to remote villages. 410 For one year, India, borrowing four hours of ATS-6 satellite time a day from NASA, conducted a pilot project known as the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE).
India undertook the responsibility for
the ground segment and the software, 1 2 while the United States,
through NASA, supplied the satellite. The bilateral regime that India and the United States established was exclusively for experimental purposes and did not allow the exchange of funds between
the two nations. Through the project, the Indians hoped to provide
educational programs in family planning, national integration, academic education, agriculture, and occupational skills. 413 In addition, they wanted to test a system of broadcasting satellite television for national development. The United States wanted to test
its FM transmitter operating in the 800-900 MHz band and to gain
4 14
experience in applying space technology.
Since the termination of the project, both parties have hailed
it as a great success in helping to spur development. India has
planned to operate a DBS system (INSAT) on a regular basis as
soon as such a system is technically feasible.4 1 5 Moreover, SITE
has proved to be a valuable example for other developing countries. 416 The United States achieved its primary objectives and also
earned profits for its space industry by selling two telecommunications satellites to India for its INSAT system. 1
2.

PEACESAT

The University of Hawaii initiated the Pan-Pacific Education
and Communications Experiments by Satellite (PEACESAT) to
409. Id.
410. Mody, Programming for SITE, 29 J. COMMUNICATIONS 90, 91 (1979).
411. Id. at 91-92; N. MATTE, supra note 394, at 163-64.
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414.
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See Mody, supra note 410, at 91-92.
Id. at 92-93.
N. MATTE, supra note 394, at 164.
Id. at 165.

416.
417.

Id.
Id.
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determine the extent to which concerned nations can utilize satellite communication to provide health care and education to island
groups in the Pacific by allowing these groups to share scarce and
costly resources.41 The United States and Australia, Fiji, the Gilbert Islands, New Guinea, New Zealand, Papua, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, and Tonga initiated the project in 1971. Each participating country was able to control the content of the programs
transmitted to its respective country.419 PEACESAT transmitted
programs to educational and medical institutions and to libraries
through the use of small and inexpensive earth stations.420 Indeed,
the entire project proved inexpensive considering its advantages;
between 1971 and 1976 operating costs of the project were under
$500,000.421 PEACESAT may pave the way for future regimes in

which an affluent country such as the United States provides
broadcasting services and programming that is sensitive to the cultural needs and tastes of recipient countries at a minimal cost.
D. Australia and Canada
Australia currently is engaging in cooperative experiments
with the Department of Communications of Canada. 422 Through
this cooperation, Australia hopes to gain experience in the utilization of satellites to establish its domestic telecommunications and
TV broadcasting system. Australia plans to launch two geostationary satellites to provide direct broadcast and telephone service to
its remote areas. 428 The Canadians, by providing training and sat-

ellite experience to the Australians, stand to gain enormous profit
from their liaison with Australia in the event the Australians decide to purchase space and ground equipment from Canada. Such
future purchases seem likely at this stage.
E. Summary
Bilateral regimes are a useful tool in guiding and establishing
mutually beneficial DBS programs. Because they are based on the
idea of "mutual benefit," they are a pragmatic and uncomplicated
form of cooperation that willing countries easily can undertake.424
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
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CONCLUSION

The discussion of direct broadcast satellite television in the
United States encompasses consideration of both the actual DBS
service and the program being broadcast. Both-the service and
the programming for that service-are in a state of flux. The FCC
stepped bravely out in front when it granted the eight DBS permits in 1982 and thus formally established a policy of nurturing
the technological development of the service and espousing a freedom of programming viewpoint through a "hands-off" regulatory
attitude. To the FCC, DBS service was and is a desirable and convenient field in which to apply its new policy of broadcast deregulation. That DBS technology is so different from previous television technology facilitated the implementation of the
Commission's new relaxed policy. The FCC action one year before
the ITU Regional Administrative Radio Conference (RARC-83)
undeniably gave the new technology a boost, and strong communications companies were ready and willing to act upon it. Although
the eight DBS permittees suffered some uncertainty before the
RARC-83, the United States approached the conference in a cooperative spirit and its delegation was able to return from the conference with more than sufficient orbital slots and frequencies for the
FCC now to confirm the eight DBS permittees and to consider a
few more applications.
The immediately favorable outcome of the conference and certain compromises by the United States delegation laid the foundation for successful future international negotiations in ITU. At
RARC-83 the United States agreed to participate in a priori planning-in which the United States until then had declined to participate. A serious test of whether this principle will be acceptable
to the United States in future participation in ITU or whether
RARC-83 merely represents a temporary compromise will occur
when the World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of
the Geostationary Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Services
Utilizing It (WARC) meets in 1985. That conference concerns DBS
because all direct broadcast satellites are in geostationary orbit;
the RARC-83 agreement is merely a recommendation to WARC85.
Free competition among the various DBS services in the
United States promises to bring the United States consumer into a
new age of communications technology with high definition television, teletext, and other new services. This development will have
important economic implications not only because it will bring new
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DBS service but also because it will provide a market for the sale
of new equipment to support the new service. Furthermore, to be
successful, the new DBS service will require new programs. DBS
will only be commercially successful if the programs are attractive
to consumers; most likely, only programs distinctive from the fare
that commercial television already offers will prove attractive.
It is in the programming context that the United States has
become embroiled in a difficult debate of the cherished first
amendment concept of the free flow of communications. In virtually all international fora there is growing discord between the
United States' position on the free flow of information and the positions of practically all other countries. This discord is most intense in debate with the communist and developing countries; it is
less severe with the other industrialized nations. Unfortunately for
the United States, the debate is taking place in United Nations
fora in which one country-one vote is the rule; thus, the United
States is totally outvoted, as the recent 108-to-13 vote in the
United Nations' General Assembly exemplifies. 4 5 A large majority

of countries in the United Nations is opposed to DBS television
without prior consultation and agreement with receiving countries.
Among the international fora, in ITU the discussion centers
upon technical aspects of DBS development-namely, upon ITU's
commitment to prevent harmful interference and to monitor overspill of the radiation of DBS satellite signals. Of course, a disincentive to investing money in television that is not free from harmful
interference exists. This disincentive has prompted the United
Kingdom to express the view that the ITU assignments have resolved the free flow debate.42 6 As agreed at WARC-77, the RARC-

83 agreement, which the United States signed with some reservations,427 provided assignment of orbital positions and frequencies.
The British view, however, has not found support; most countries
continue to insist that an international regime must impose specific program controls on DBS services. Indeed, in another international forum, UNESCO, members have approved declarations and
plans favoring the right of each country to decide on the content of
commercial and educational DBS programs transmitted into a
country from abroad. 42 8 The United States, of course, has objected.

Such strenuous objection from the United States may not be un425.
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derstood well by foreign countries that are familiar with content
regulation within the United States. Freedom of speech is regulated in the United States whenever the government has a legitimate interest in preserving public order and avoiding violence.2 9
The FCC regulated the broadcast media because of the limited
availability of resources and the corresponding public interest in
the use of the airwaves. 3 0 Such justifications, however, do not pertain readily to DBS.
The free flow versus noninterventionist debate has been most
intense and of longest duration in the United Nations. Early in the
debate the USSR claimed the right to be free from television programs propagandizing violence, horrors, pornography, and the use
of narcotics. 3 ' More importantly, the USSR also would make illegal all other programs televised to the USSR from foreign countries without the consent of the USSR. The Soviet stand against
free flow of communications found some sympathy in most other
countries. The developing countries proved to be the Soviet's
staunchest allies in the debate; the United States, of course, positioned itself antithetically. The technical and economic advantages
that the United States enjoys over other nations partially explain
the lack of support for the American position.
The United Nations discussion came to a conclusion in the
December 1982 General Assembly resolution. While the resolution
does not declare specifically that each country has a right to control all communication within its sovereign borders, it does provide
that:
A state which intends to establish or authorize the establishment of an
international direct television broadcasting satellite service shall without delay notify the proposed receiving state or states of such intention and shall
promptly enter into consultations with any of those states which so requests.
An international direct television broadcasting satellite service shall only
be established after the conditions set forth in [the above] paragraph have
been met and on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements in conformity
with the relevant instruments of the International
Telecommunications
4 32
Union and in accordance with these principles.

The content of these provisions and the overwhelming support
that these provisions and the resolution as a whole received, however, are tempered by the realization that resolutions of the United
Nations' General Assembly are not treaties and do not have the
429. See supra part II, section A, subsection 1.

430. See supra part II, section A, subsection 2.
431. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
432. See 1982 United Nations Resolution, supra note 360.
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binding effect of treaties. Whether a more binding instrument soon
will follow remains to be seen.
In contrast to the relative lack of suc'cess in multilateral negotiations concerning the program content of DBS, the United States
has enjoyed mutually beneficial bilateral arrangements with Canada, with India, and with certain developing Polynesian nations.
That the United States is at odds with other countries on DBS
programming and on the free flow of DBS programs should not
overshadow the American successes in these bilateral arrangements
and in agreeing with other countries on necessary DBS service in
ITU and RARC-83. At RARC-83 the United States received sufficient orbital slots and frequencies to meet its current DBS
needs-whether or not the service can flow into other nations with
which no bilateral agreement exists. This country, therefore, is assured of new and exciting domestic television service in the near
future.

